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The subject of "decision-making" has been of Interest
to me for years. Decision-making is, of course, that necessary
privilege or chore constantly facing every individual in his
daily living. To a military officer, decision-making must
become an automatic, natural leadership characteristic and
specialty. He la in a position of being responsible in decision-
making not merely for himself but constantly must be weighing
the consequences of hla actions or planned actions on those
subordinate to hla leadership position.
During the research phase of this thesis, I became
aware while examining the process of decision-making of the very
close relationship and complementary functions of control and
communications. The cycle of planning decisions being made and
communicated to subordinates for action, the resulting perform-
ance of those subordinate personnel or the adequacy of the
planning as indicated by a feedback of information to the
planner, the use of this information for the control of further
planning actions result in a closed-loop system. While delving
on this relationship I became interested in the many connota-
tions for the word "control". The original scope of this thesis
was thus broadened to include the combination of decision-making
and control as the relationship is described in Chapter I. The
or areas of the Department of Defense where decision-making
ii

controls play an important role are next examined. The top
decision-makers being civilian led to the area of control as
described in Chapter II. Financial control which has become
almost synonymous in use with the terms "management control"
is the subject of Chapter III. The concept of "command and
control" in view of the rapid rate of technological changes and
the possible impact this might bring to our traditional organi-
sational structures and operating procedures is developed and
analyzed in Chapters XV and V.
Having Just completed a tour of duty as Team Chief of
one of the five Emergency Action Teams manning the national
Military Command Center I was prompted to mention briefly this
command and control organisation. My assignment to this military
organisation 9 which is a part of the overall Joint Chiefs of
Staff Organisation % proved most interesting and enlightening.
During my tour* November 196l-May 19&3* many of the changes to
the command and control environment as described were taking
place. A much greater number of improvements are in the offing
as technological advances occur.
The greatest benefit to be derived from this paper has
been that gained by the writer. Ky own views concerning manage-
ment concepts , as well as my education as a generallst, have
been broadened immeasurably.
I acknowledge my appreciation to Professor Gilbert C.
Jacobus who introduced me to the new management field of
automatic data processing, to Dr. Richard Ericson who stimulated
my thoughts on organisational structuring as affected by the
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implementation of automatic data processing and other contem-
porary tools of management, and to Dr. Karl 2. Stromsem who
offered helpful suggestions in the development and presentation
of this thesis. X also formally tender my thanks to my wife,
Willa, who durinp my "absence** so competently and devotedly
maintained equilibrium in our family by performing my "control**
functions with the children, including a daughter born in
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As implied by the title of en article by Hans J.
Morgenthau, "Bigness Is Hot To Be Done Away With, It Is To Be
Controlled,* there is a great deal of public Interest in and,
often, antagonism towards large organizations. Attention seems
most predominant in peacetime and is especially focused at the
world's largest organization, the Department of Defense
.
Critical analysis by the average American taxpayer seems entirely
justifiable when considering the extremely large appropriations
annually requested of Congress to support the national defense
effort* It is not just the dollar amounts that attract the
public's attention. There is also the continuing concern felt
by many that an inverse relationship does apply when contrasting
corporate power to individual freedom; that is, an increase in
corporate power will result in a decrease in individual freedom.
Then, too, people often associate "bigness" with complexity or
bureaucracy which, they reason, leads to inefficiency and waste.
Mr. Morgenthau stated? 1
I have looked in vain for a discussion, for instance,
of the paradox of the enormous concentration of power in
the hands of the government coupled with the government's
inability to govern effectively. ...
Senator J. W. Fulbright recently touched off sn
1
Edward Reed (ed.), Review of "Challenges to Democracy!
The Next 10 Years," New York Times, 26 January 1964, p. 6.

explosive debate on policy when he stated: "The American people
are not now exercising effective control over the military,
and neither is the Congress •"^
A recent article by Jack Anderson was entitled! "Billion
Dollar Blunders—How your tax dollars are being wasted by
-2
squabbling brass hats,"
This thesis is directed towards an examination of the
current status of the basic controls for management and their
applications within the Department of Defense In order to better
understand or to better judge the validity of any such statements
or criticism.
A review and evaluation of the Defense Department has
been conducted along the lines provided by President Eisenhower
when he submitted Reorganisation Plan Mo, 6, based on the
proposals of the Rockefeller Committee, to Congress on 30 April
1953- At that time, the President cited three basic objectives
to guide the organization of the Defense structures^
1. There must be clear and unchallenged civilian
responsibility • , • not only to maintain democratic
institutions but also to protect the Integrity of
the military profession.
2, Effectiveness with economy must be made the
watchwords of our defense effort.
1
The Washington Post
. 7 April 1964, p. A6.
2 ^
Ibid, Parade, 23 June 1963, P» &•
^William H, Kintner, Forging A New Sword (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1953), p, 4£.

3. We must develop the beat possible military
plans. They must incorporate the most competent and
considered thinking from every point of view—military,
scientific, industrial, and economic.
In order to clarify lines of authority so as to
strengthen civilian responsibility, the President's message
outlined the basic channels of responsibility as running from
the President through the Secretary of Defense and the Secre-
taries of the military departments to the unified commands.
As a means to achieve effectiveness with economy the
President emphasised decentralisation of operations under
flexible and effective direction and control from the center.
However, in the President's words s "No function in any part
of the Department of Defense or in any of its component agencies
is to be performed independent of the direction, authority,
1
and control of the Secretary of Defense."
The message also called for study and improvement of
the internal organisation of the military departments, study and
reorganisation of procurement and supply procedures and machinery,
study and development of policies for attracting and holding
competent career civil and military personnel in the Defense
Department, and improved organisation of the Joint Staff so that
the Joint Chiefs might better perform their roles as strategic
planners and military advisers.




Iorganization and procedures to perforin the tasks contributing
to national policy planning depends to a degree upon the ade-
quacy of the government-wide planning structure. The strategic
concepts and plans of the military forces must be effectively
tied into overall national strategy; and the programs to
implement Defense Department responsibility within the national
strategy must be geared to budget policies and to the budgetary
cycle • Military plans and programs are valid to the extent that
financial means are made available for their Implementation.
Of utmost importance to the life of any organisation
is the ability of its leaders to make decisions* In the Defense
Department decision-making is vital to the survival of not Just
an organisation but of a nation and "free world" • In 1961 e the
Deputy Secretary of Defense stated: 1 "The two major problems
confronting the Department of Defense are: the amount of time
it takes to get a decision; and the problem of how to apply
military power to aid national goals."
The modern military decision process is much misunder-
stood. Immediate operational decisions, such as committing
forces to combat, have been made promptly with or without
military advice in the past. The really complex decisions , on
the other hand, are the long-range strategic, political, and
economic Issues which form the very core of the national strategy.
1
Armed Forces Management , November 19<>1, P. 26.

5These are the daily problems of weapons, dollars, foroe levels,
and fundamentals of strategy which rarely have a simple, finite
answer* These are the problems which need not and generally
should not be solved by the quick decision process of a
streamlined organization, which may merely substitute authori-
tarian rule for democratic debate.
Decision-making and control are the functional principles
used as the foundation for this analysis of the Defense Depart-
ment, The gamut of primary deoision-makinp; and control areas
is examined. This study is climaxed by delving: into the newer
potentials for the modern command and control systems. Rapid
progress is now being attained in applying the latest techno-
logical advances and in using the newest scientific management
tools for obtaining the shortest possible reaction times for
decisions. National security dictates the need for rapid,
flexible command and control systems. The solution is found in
the field of fully-integrated, data processing and communications
systems. The Importance of utilising the newest management
techniques and tools as assistance for decision-making is becom-
ing more apparent to managers. Future uses of automation look
even more appealing for managers as progress continues in
computer coismunl cations.
1
Paul R. Schrats, "A Look at Civilian Control,
"




As Secretary of Defense McNamara has said:
Major decision-making involved in the management
of the military establishment requires perhaps a
thousand decisions in the course of a year. In addition
to budget issues there are, of course s many other ques-
tions that under our system must ultimately be decided
by civilian authority, including those relating to force
structure, and strengths, new weapons systems, locations
of new installations, source selections for major pro-
duction programs and the like.
If we are to achieve our primary mission • • •
obtaining the optimum amount of combat power • • •
decisions must be made promptly • • .too much time
slows up our most important projects.
Almost any action is better than no action. 1
Decision-making is one of the most Important functions
of any manager; in fact, many management texts imply that
decision-making is really the heart of managerial activity.
Decision is the peak between preparatory study and execution.
It is most valuable when taken at the right time. In order to
organize, direct, or control the actions of subordinates toward
attaining the desired objective a manager must make the decisions
which will, in turn, affect the behavior of those subordinates.
Even with the many technological advances being made, such as
in automation, there is still the need in the final analysis
1
Armed Forces Management B November 1961, p. 22.

7for a human decision to control the execution of that which
intelligence or electronic data processing may decree to be the
correct solution.
Decision-making means to make a choice from among two
2
or more alternatives. In this regard, Secretary McNamara has
stated t "I want real alternatives that actually call for a
decision, not just a paperwork invitation to rubber stamp
3
something." However people, when confronted with awkward
problems or situations about which they are imperfectly informed,
are prone to feel that to do nothing is somehow a means to avoid
the responsibility for any possible adverse consequences of
positive action. The fear of a wrong decision is more compelling:
k
than that of making no decision. A decision to do nothing is,
however, still a decision. It is a prediction that the individ-
ual or the undertaking will be allowed time to escape the conse-
quences of having done nothing. Secretary McNamara has given
warning that he will look with more favor on the manager who
after adequate consideration makes a prompt decision that proves
to be wrong than he will on the manager who delays a decision,
Robert Tannenbaura, "Managerial Decia ion-Making, n
Journal of Business . January 1950, p. 28.
2
Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York:
The Maomlllan Company, 1958;, p. lb.
Armed Forces Management . November 19^1 » P« 24.
l.
Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(Cambridge: Harvard University i»ress, 1951), P. 19i«

8thereby seriously restricting or hindering the entire defense
operation,, This does not imply that all questions must be
speedily resolved. The art of decision-making may also involve
not deciding questions under certain circumstances; such as,
when they are not pertinent, too premature , cannot be made
2
effective, or should be made by others.
All decisions are financial—either because they directly
affect the expenditures of money or because they indirectly
affect expenditures by consuming or disposing of effort, faci-
lities, or material, all of which cost money.' This is the
philosophy behind the increasing emphasis attached to the role
of the financial executive, or controller* The old role of a
financial executive was past-oriented and consisted primarily
of scorekeeping by keeping arithmetic records of past achieve-
ment. Management has coined a phrase describing the "old"
accountant—Hthe incompetent reporting the irrelevant to the
indifferent." The new role of a financial executive is future-
oriented and Is premised on attention-directing and problem-
solving with the aid of operations research, systems design,
1
Armed Forces Manarement , November 1961, p. 23.
Robert Durbin, Human Relations In Administration
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1^1), p. 205.
3
Alvin Brown, "All Decisions Are Financial," Financial
Approach to Indust ri al Operations , Society for Advancement of
Management, 1957, p. 8.
h
G. L. Phillips, "Financial Executive's Role in Tomorrow's
Business," Financial Executive, February 1963, P. 22.

9and other management science tools. In the new role, the
financial executive becomes the focal point for the information
and intelligence center for the entire business. His new
functional relationship is to provide information for management
decision-making and to measure and thereby assist management in
the Job of controlling operations. There is plenty of informa-
tion available but a need to arrange it in a useful manner. As
0. L. Phillips wrote: "In the midst of a data explosion we
encounter an information crisis • * A financial executive keeps
the flood of data under purposeful control and channels it where
the information may be most helpful in decision-making.
Exchange of information is the first need when coordi-
nated actions are to be conducted by organizations, Plans and
decisions must be based upon facts , assumptions , and values
which are subject to change, A decision is only a moment in a
process. To retain their validity, decisions must be reviewed
and revised as changes occur. Uses of information which are
vital to the effective manager in the conduct of daily activities
mipht be that which:
1. Determine problem areas





Lee 0, Thayer, Administrative Communication (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 19&1), P« 1^2,
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Decisional Information flows from higher to lower levels
and information about performance from lower to higher levels.
Without information feeding into, through, and out of an
organization, it would quickly collapse.
The management hierarchy may be viewed as a structure
of communication centers through which decision and control
information is transmitted to and from the performance level.
Executive decisions may be broadly categorized as planning and
control decisions. Planning decisions by superiors Impose
organizational responsibilities or set forth norms of behavior
for subordinate personnel. However the possibility that the
subordinates may not properly respond makes necessary feedback
or control information about the relationship between planned
and actual performance. The communications cycle thus begins
with planning decisions setting forth previously nonexistent
behavioral norms, which are communicated to subordinate manager-
ial or nonmanagerial personnel. Performance information is
relayed back to the superior, who may make control decisions
if behavior is not in accordance with the norms of planning
decisions.
Management is a process of organizing and employing
resources to accomplish predetermined objectives. In order
1
Henry H. Albers, Organized Executive Action






to achieve maximum operating effectiveness in accomplishing
these objectives , executives perform certain functions which






Controlling is the process of determining whether or not
actual operations are proceeding as desired and of taking
appropriate action, based on evaluation and adequate information
and promptly communicated to the persons responsible* Essentials
2
of controlling are to*
1* Ascertain the extent to which operations are
proceeding according to plan,
2* Evaluate the facts and work out any necessary
correlative actions*
3. Make corrections and modifications in time
to bring the operations into line with plans, and
their revisions, without loss of effort*
4* Evaluate the extent to which operations contribute
to the overall effectiveness*
Control, as a noun, signifies the ways and means of
keeping track of the progress of operations. As a verb, control
means the active policing of an operation to keep it within the
Henri Payol, Industrial and General Administration
(Londons Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 19**9J» P* *»3.
"The Management Process, " Air Force Manual 25-1 *
September 1954, p. 43*
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strict limits of the task as defined.
Control is the executive action arising from top-
management policy decisions* There is an element of controlling
action in all management activities; the process starts from
the policy decisions made as a result of the intelligent study
of the facts and statistics provided for the purpose. Planning
makes the rulej control enforces it by compelling events to
conform with plans. Evidence indicates that this enforcement
function is required for optimum attainment of an objective.
Effective control must operate within a reasonable time period
and be followed up quickly with appropriate corrective action.
Furthermore, control must not produce a duality of management
between those who manage the departments and those who exercise
the control functions. Just as no person can be said to control
directly the activities assigned to another's jurisdiction, so
the only person who can directly control activities is the one
directly responsible for them. This is fundamental to the
successful operation of any enterprise; at the same time it is
probably one of the least observed principles of management.
To offset this infiltration of control into management and
department running, the powers of control must be defined at
the outset as precisely as possible. Higher authority must then
1
T. 0. Rose and Donald E. Farr, Higher Management





ensure the control limits are not exceeded.
There are two general areas of the control of operations*
the human and the technical. There Is a danger that In petting
too absorbed with the technical side the tendency Is to lose
sight of the fact that control of human activity Is the reason
why an organization exists and that manpower is a major factor
being managed. Statistics are valuable for information. The
statistics reflect in a quantitative way: men, materials, and
money. The factors involved, not the technique for relating
these factors, are the important resources to be managed, A
failure to develop the understanding and sympathy necessary for
dealing; with human beings can, for instance, result in poor
results towards attaining an objective. Insofar as the technical
side, management is responsible for providing people with the
necessary tools, skills, materials and machines.
Control, in the minds of many, has become firmly
identified with comptrollers, numerical data, dollar signs,
statistics, accounting and organizational charts. Managers
control and direct the utilisation of resources and are, in
turn, controlled and directed by higher authorities. Plans and
budgets together provide a picture of what is intended and the
means by which the goals are to be achieved. Budgeting is most
effective when it rests upon a foundation of integrated planning
Wol. Xcc. It.... 109.
JRc. Md f.rr, loSl_slt..p. 6».
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for the entire operation. Properly conceived and used, plans
and budgets are devices to assure correlated and consistent
actions in the future and are important elements in implementing
effective control.
It is in the control area that raany mistakes of budgeting
are made, such as: Amateurs have censured their subordinates
for exceeding budgets, without realising that they themselves
way have not provided the proper guidance; men have become so
frustrated under raaladsinlstered budgets that they have resorted
to all sorts of tricks to conceal the actual results and have
padded their budgets to obtain that extra cushion of security;
staff personnel have usurped authority; merited pay Increases
have been denied because of budget limitations; and tales rather
than facts may have been carried to the top under the guise
of budget reporting.
^
Budgets are messages that express organizational and
departmental plans and anticipated consequences of future
operations in quantitative terras* What is needed is an under-
standing that the functions of planning and budgeting are for
the entire organisation and must be utilized at every level of
\Tames L, Fierce, "The Budget Comes of Age," Harvard
Business Review
. Hay-June 195**, p» 445.
2
Arnold F. Emch, "Control Means Action," Harvard
Business Review
. July-August 1954, P. 437.
3
Pierce, loc. cit. a p. 447,
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responsibility. Budgetary controls can increase managerial
and operational efficiency. Every key executive should be his
own "controller**. In this sense , control can be as much an
energizing as a directing function. Control involves guiding
and self-directing and has as its most important continuing
activity a positive motivation towards goals. The ultimate aim
of all control, except that of the mechanical world, is self-
motivation. Therefore, to a great extent, control is a state
of mind.
Management control seeks to compel events to conform
to plans. The manager himself is the focal point and uses
organizational coordination as the means for maintaining control.
Basic principles of management control are as follows:^
1. Strategic Point Control. This principle states
that the most effective control occurs when primary attention
is given to such factors as are strategic to the appraisal of
performance; this is a refinement and extension of the manage-
ment by exception principle.
2, Organizational Suitability. Since managers and
their subordinates are the means through which planning events
must be accomplished and control exerted, it follows that
Paul M. Dauten, Jr., Current lasues and Emerfrlnp Con-
cepts in ?4anageroent (Boston j Houghton Mi^lin Company, 1962),
p. 112.
2 Albers, loc. clt .. p. 388.
^Harold Koontz, **The Flanning and Controlling of
Organizational Activities,** Journal of the Academy of Management »
April 1956, p. 52.
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effective controls must be applicable to a manager's area of
authority and, therefore, »uat reflect organisational structure.
3. Future Controls. Since the past cannot be changed,
effective control should be aimed at preventing present and
future deviations fron plans; feedback should be instantaneous
so that deviations never occur.
*». Direct Control. This principle emphasizes that the
stoat effective technique of control is to assure the quality
of subordinates, particularly managers. The best managers make
fewer mistakes, plan better and more thoroughly, establish a
clear and coordinated organization, do the beat job of selecting
and training subordinates, and most effectively direct the acti-
vities of subordinates. An inportant control device might
conceivably be a reliable, certified management audit. Care
must be taken in the selection and placing of the subordinate
leaders. As Paul Appleby has written:
There is more inadequacy in government because of
the inability of officials to operate on their proper
levels than from any other single cause. But such
inadequacy is not inevitable} it is not something that
cannot be improved; it is not something predetermined
by the limits of the human mind. It stems chiefly from
a failure to realize the importance of taking careful
note of the qualities of mind, tempersment, and personality
required for a position on a given level and then searching
for those qualities in the person to be appointed.
This search for qualified applicants for Federal service
is currently being stressed. At the same time that President
Paul K. Appleby, Big Democracy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 19*15), p- 70.
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Johnson has projected a reduction in federal civilian employment
of 7265 by the end of fiscal 19^5, there is another report in the
saraa newspaper with the headlines "Need For Qualified in Federal
Service Fises. w The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
John W, Kacy, stated that there is a quest for quality and that
Federal personnel officers are tightening up on the qualifica-
tions that likely 'cants possess. Mr. Macy added:
There are very fine career opportunities in the Federal
civil service. In a sense the opportunities will he
better than ever because of the increased emphasis that
must be placed on excellence* The element of quality
in selecting employees for Government service becomes
more important than ever, for there is much essential
work to be done and it must be done better by fewer
people,
1
Control also has the meaning: to exercise authority
2
over f direct, command. This concept will be examined In a
more detailed manner in the next chapter. The importance of the
role and the need for highly qualified civilian personnel
becomes more apparent as one studies the heavy responsibilities
and criticial decision-making confronting the civil officials
charged with the awesome tasks of efficient management control
of the military establishment.
1
The Government Employees' Exchange « Washington, D. C.
,
25 Rarch I$M, p. 1.
Webster' 8 New World Dictionary (New York: The World
Publishing Company, 1958), p. lbi>.

CHAPTER TI
CIVILIAN VERSOS MILITARY CONTROL
In no country has more emphasis been placed on the
supremacy of civilian power over the military than in the
United States.
It is fundamental to our political heritage that the
military forces be subordinate to the control of civilian repre-
sentatives of the people and thus, ultimately, to the people
themselves. This concept, cherished by all responsible elements
of our society, including the military, has been expressed in
various clauses of the Constitution as well as in innumerable
legislative acts and resolutions throughout our history. On the
basis of these fundamental statutes and their administrative
extension has developed a pattern of civilian-military relation-
ships which provide the basic framework for maintaining civilian
control over the exercise of our national military power. 1
Nevertheless, laws, regulations and organisational
procedures rightfully are prescribed that make certain, as
much as such things can, that the military forces, despite their
daily obedience to their leaders, would obey the elected heads
1
Harold Zink, "American Civil-Military Relations in the
Occupation of Germany," Total War and Cola war , edited by





of the government if a disagreement should ever develop between
the civilian heads of the government and military leaders.
The Constitution names the President as the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces. The President, by virtue of the
authority granted by the National Security Act of 19^7 as
amended, appoints a Secretary of Defense as his principal
assistant in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense is delegated direction, authority, and
control over the Defense Department. The present chain of
command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to
the Secretaries of the military departments to the Chiefs of
Staff of their respective military services. However the 19^7
National Security Act also established the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as the principal military advisers to the President, the National
Security Counoil, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chiefs of
the military services thus have two different relationships to
their civilian superiors. As the operational leaders of their
respective military services they must follow the command line
up through their departmental civilian Secretaries, but in their
corporate responsibility as the Joint Chiefs cf Staff they may
advise directly the President and the national Security Council
as well as the Secretary of Defense. Normally the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the military representative to the
National Security Council and with the President.
Kintner, loc. clt.. p. 61.
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Politically-appointed top-level civil officials of the
Defense Department should exercise general policy control over
all the programs and operations of the Department . Civilian
control should also serve for:
1. Authoritative coordination and unified direction of
the Defense Department operations,
2. Effective integration of nonmllitary factors into
the predominantly military activities,
3. Achievement of the highest possible levels of
economy and efficiency.
The progressional military are also responsible to the
civilian Congress. By the Constitution, 1 Congress is "empowered
to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces , , • to raise and support armies • • • to provide
and maintain a navy," The National Security Act specifically
provides that the Secretary or military Chief of a military
department, on his own initiative, and after informing the
Secretary of Defense, may present to Congress any recommendation
concerning the Department of Defense he may deem proper. This
responsibility to Congress is made tangible by the Congressional
power over the military purse through its control of annual
appropriations
•
The Chiefs of Staff, both in their service and their
The Constitution of the United States
. Article I,
Section 8, Paras. 12, 13 f 1**.




Joint Chief capacity, are required to appear frequently to
testify before Congressional committees. The hearings on the
defense budget are usually difficult for the Chiefs, since these
hearings inevitably raise the issue of their divided responsi-
bilities towards the Executive and Legislative Branches of the
Government. Ho sooner has the Chief of Staff read his prepared
statement supporting the position of the Defense Department
than he must face a battery of interrogators bent on bringinF
forth his own views. The Chief of Staff may shortly find himself
in the position either of appearing to oppose his civilian
superiors or of withholding facts from the Congress. With such
diversified responsibility to civilian control, the Chief of
Staff can encounter real conflict in determining the priority
and the proper role commensurate to his responsibility. Congress
must legislate on the basis of the best obtainable knowledge and
advice. To whom can they turn other than to the Chiefs of Staff,
who are responsible for our national defense? To deprive Con-
gress of access to the views of the Chiefs of Staff would
inevitably force them to seek less responsible sources of
advice, to the probable detriment of our security. Ac Repre-
sentative Gerald R. Ford, serving on the Subcommittee on
Appropriations for the Department of Defense since the 83rd
Congress and a member of the Committee on Astronautics and
Space Exploration since the 85th Congress, has stated:
There is no use beating around the bush about it,
we in Congress are faced with a serious dilemma as we
review such complex and technical subjects as aerospace
command and control systems.
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We Congressmen are required to wake the best
possible analysis of these programs and policies and
arrive at decisions which Involve billions of tax
dollars and possibly our national security. But as
Congressmen we lack the specialized knowledge to do
this Job as well as we would like.
A problem the 13-member subcommittee now faces
involves the best method of developing an operational
communications satellite system. Should we place these
satellites into random orbit for a half billion dollars,
or should we wait until we know how to develop a
synchronous system of stationary satellites? Other
problems; the ability of our various warning systems
to detect planes and missiles approaching from any
direction; the roles of the Air Force and NASA; the
effect of the enemy weapons systems on our own reta-
liatory capability.
Certainly one can argue that seven lawyers, one
engineer, one accountant, one newspaper publisher, and
three businessmen lack the qualifications to pass on a
multi-billion dollar defense appropriation measure.
It teaches us the need for heavy reliance on the
representatives of the Executive Branch—the civilian
and military leaders of the Department of Defense. We
must rely on these people. And to do so, we should have
confidence in them. We do not always have that confi-
dence, unfortunately. Sometimes witnesses will fail to
give us complete information or one witness 1 words
contradict another's. If we should fail to properly
evaluate their testimony, trouble and confusion could
easily result. One of our primary concerns, therefore,
is that the Executive Branch gets and keeps the finest
sort of talent to assist Congress in its policy role.
A good witness must know his subject; he must be com-
pletely frank but must feel free to constructively
criticize rival programs or even the decisions of his
superiors when the necessity arises, particularly if
a member of the committee asks questions on the subject.
Our decisions are too important to let personal ambitions
prohibit full disclosure of relevant information. We
welcome constructive criticism and explanation of alter-
native views, for frank and honest evaluations build
confidence. And confidence in the expert testimony
given to us is the vital element in making sound decisions
in these highly technical fields. Most of us do have
background knowledge and experience. As Representative
Flood of Pennsylvania likes to say, "Admirals and Generals
come and go before this committee like Greyhound busses,
but we've been here for ten years and more."
Our committee's fund of specialized knowledge about
advanced computer systems, satellite communications and
the vast complex called "command and control" will continue
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to accumulate. We will never be fully expert In the
field. But through mutual confidence and cooperation
between technicians and politicians, we trust that
mistakes will be kept at a minimum.*
In expressing his views on this divided responsibility
General Taylor has said:
The problem of the Chief of Staff appearing before
a Congressional committee is to "tell the truth and shame
the devil," while remaining loyal to the decisions of
the President and the Secretary of Defense. This is not
a simple ethic to apply in practice. The service Chief
should present his views vigorously within the Department
of Defense during the formulation of the budget or of
any other measure of similar importance. Having made
every effort to guide his civilian superiors in the direc-
tion which he believes right, the Chief of Staff must
accept the decisions of the Secretary of his service, of
the Secretary of Defense, and of the President as final
and thereafter support them before Congress. The alter-
native is resignation.
2
According: to this pattern for the exercise of civilian
control, it remains the proper responsibility of the professional
military personnel to advise their civilian superiors on the
development and employment of military forces and to conduct
the actual military operations under the over-all policy control
of the politically responsible civilians. The nature of poten-
tial armed conflict today places great strain upon our tradi-
tional channels of military responsibility. The military forces
are responsible to civilian Secretaries in the Defense Depart-
ment, to the President, to the Congress, and to the people.
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Representative Gerald H. Ford, "A Congressional View
of Technology," Data, March 1963, P. 37.
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Oeneral *%xwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet
(New York: Harper & Brothers, I960), p. 112.
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Channels of command must continue to permit full consideration
of expert military advice by the Executive Branch, Congress and
the public in order that our defense policies and programs may
be responsive to our security needs and obtain the national
support needed to make them effective,
A central factor for the future must continue to be an
effective civilian control while maintaining a meaningful role
for the military and the integrating of military and nonrailitary
factors in the decision-making process.
The concept of civilian control has been well established
in principle and in fact. What is of more concern is the way in
which that control is exercised. The Presidential message
accompanying Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953 pointed out the
need to maintain a careful civilian-military balance both to
guarantee the integrity of the professional military forces
necessary for effective military action whenever required and
to maintain at all times basic United States democratic institu-
tions and principles. The words of the message were: MBaeic
decisions relating to the military forces must be made by
politically-accountable civilian officials. Conversely, pro-
fessional military leaders must not be thrust into the political
arena to become the prey of partisan politics." Thus true
civilian control consists not in detailed civilian supervision
over the armed forces but in the exercise of ultimate authority
by civil officials who are in turn held accountable for the
Kintner, loc. clt.» p. 6*1.
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manner in which they perform their functions.
There has been some effort to differentiate functions
by giving civilian secretariats principal responsibility for the
support, supply, and business management of the armed forces and
assigning military staffs the responsibility for planning and
directing military operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
responsible for the development of strategic and operational
plans for the employment of the armed forces; the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense act as civilian vice-presidents in broad
fields of "producer logistics," such as budgetary and fiscal
control, installations and logistics, manpower, and research
and engineering. In the military departments, civilian secre-
tariats are concerned with similar broad fields of "producer
logistics" and the military staffs are responsible for "user
logistics" as involved in actual military operations and direct
logistic support of combat units. On the whole, the second
Hoover Commission supported this general principle that what is
considered as business functions should be managed directly by
civilians. 1
There also has been some tendency to Judge effective
civilian control in terras of the number of civilian officials in
top-level positions and the extent of their activities. Some
desire that civilian Secretaries exercise "active" rather than
"passive" control over all the military functions. This concept
1
Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton,
M. J.I Princeton University Press, 1961), P. 322.
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of an "active" approach would seem to require the staffs
supporting the ton civil officials to enter increasingly into
operational control of military activities. Secretary McNamara
has summed up his management philosophy by sayinr:
Let me say, first, I have never met the perfect
administrator and certainly I'm not one. There are
many similarities between administration in any large
organisation, including the Ford Motor Company, and the
administration problems we face in Defense, In both
cases, we're dealing with large numbers of necnle. We
attempt to formulate objectives, and lead our people
toward them efficiently and effectively, I try to
surround myself with able people, and lead them as
effectively as I can, utilizing their talents to the
full.
An administrator can follow either one or two
alternative approaches. One I call the Judicial process,
or the judicial role. In this instance, the administrator
waits for the problems to be brought to him, along with
proposed solutions, which he either accepts or rejects.
In the other case—the alternative—a man plays an
active role as a leader, probing for problems, seeking
to develop solutions, accepting suggestions, requesting
the advice of experienced personnel. He then acts
decisively and effectively to accomplish the solution.
This latter is the approach we're trying to take in
Defense today,
*
Too much Intervention by top-level civilian officials
into operations would not only prejudice the speed and precision
of the operation but also would increase the time involved in
detailed matters at the expense of time and staff guidance needed
for considering those broad issues of defense policy with which
they should be dealing. The result would be an overload imposed
on top-level decision-makers and an infringement of the opera-
tional responsibility of the implementing agencies,
1
Armed Forces Management . November 1962, p, 18.
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Instead, the stated alia of the President t In recommending
the adoption of Heorjranizaticn Plan Ho, 6, was to combine
effective civilian policy control with decentralization of
operations. Some confusion arises from the fact that the area
of interest and responsibility of the military staffs cover the
same fields as those covered by the staffs of the civilian
Secretaries, While there has been a general effort to keep the
Office of the Secretary of Defense at the minimum possible
personnel level, all staff officials responsible for central
policy review and control face the continuing problem of effect-
ively carrying out their responsibilities without violating the
principle of decentralized operations and without encroaching
upon the line of command.
So long as an Assistant Secretary of Defense or a
Secretary of a military department is charged with a responsi-
bility for overseeing the performance of a particular function
by one or several services, he will maintain a special staff to
discharge that responsibility. Although he may attempt to
perform his supervisory functions through policy control alone,
the pressures of being answerable to the service Secretary,
Secretary of Defense, or the Congress will probably lead him to
direct operational control whenever the multiplicity of policy
staff levels or confused communications channels tend to
Jeopardize his personal reputation for effectiveness.
Democratic institutions and principles are capable of
bein& misused or abused. Basic policy, including military
policy, should be made by officials responsible to the people
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with whon sovereignty ultimately rests* Certain interest groups
may exploit civilian control to their advantages and at the
expense of rival interests, but this in no way invalidates the
principle of civilian control by politically-accountable civil
officials.
According to Clausewltz, war by its very nature is a
means to a political endj if there is no political Qi\d t war has
nc utility. This is one of the reasons why statesmen, not
soldiers, should determine policy. However in this era of total
war and with the many technological developments affecting our
society, the civilian and salutary aspects of policy—foreign,
military and economic—are closely related.
Since total war is not as practical an instrument of
policy, greater stress is now laid on a strategy of deterrence.
This has forced the military to take cognizance of a broad range
of political, social, and economic considerations. A main con-
cern of national policy is the allocation of resources. The
unprecedented size and scope of the demands of the Defense
Establishment have forced policy-makers to inquire more and
usore into the military sphere.
Policy developsnent requires an effective and balanced
blending of civilian and military thinking if realistic and
valid decisions are to be made. The division of responsibility
between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries
1
Coles, loc. clt .. p. 4.
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of Defense can obstruct the optimum use of civilian and
professional military talent. The committee nature of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff which emphasizes the importance of reaching
unanimous agreement on conclusions and plans has resulted in
compromised and delayed Military piano because of differences
of service views. The predominantly-civilian staffs in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense then make basic decisions
to "settle" divergent service strategic or logistic concepts
in order to come up with definite programs that can be fitted
into a unified budp-et. Under such conditions, civilians are
making military decisions for which professional service per-
sonnel should be better qualified. In this respect, political
control of the military is little different from political
control of civil servants, scientists, or other technical types.
It is not Just a matter of keeping the military subordinate to
the civilian authorities but is the effective formulation of
national policy by increasingly taking into consideration the
military implications.
President Eisenhower in his farewell address on 19
January 1961 was concerned with the contemporary threat to the
public f s control when he said: "In the councils of government
we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence
whether sought or unsought by the military-Indus try complex." 1
1
Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, The Essential
Llppiaann (New York? Handora House, 1963)» p. 5^.
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Perhaps the roost vital element in any organization is
the manpower within it. The adequacy with which the Defense
Department functions in fulfilling its task of enhancing the
national security depends ultimately upon the qualifications,
motivation, and morale of the civilian and military personnel
who are responsible for rsaintaining: the military niffht. Policies,
plans, and weapons are meaningless when separated from the human
belnfs who develon and utilize them.
The complexity and seriousness of today's national
security problems demand the best brains the nation can provide.
Some of these "best brains'* are Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine officers and Civil Service personnel, tfore and more,
though, the national security problem has involved the use of
political executives, drawn from U. S. universities and research
i
centers. These non-career executives—originally trained in
such diverse fields as physics, mathematics, electrical engineer-
ing, law, history, political science, economics—are no longer
amateurs in dealing with military problems. They have made a
quaai-pro'ession of defense analysis and policy. Some have
published their findings in books that have had a wide impact.
Many have left the intellectual cloisters to become consultants
to the military, and some h*sve made their way into the upper
ranks of the civilian Defense Establishment. As KcOeorge Bundy,
the former Harvard Dean who serves as White House aide for
1
Marver H. Bernstein, The Job of the'Federal [Executive
(Washington? The Brookings Institution, 3R58), p. 10.
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national security affairs has ©aid:
national security problems are a compound of
technology, military strategy and tactics , budgeting,
diplomacy, politics, and nothing in these problems
really &ives one kind of person an advantage over
another. You want different kinds of people. It
would be foolish to make the chief analyst of RAND
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and vice
versa. What is necessary is a fruitful tension between
people.
1
The Defense organization must be so designed as to
attract and retain sufficient qualified manpower.
Certain personnel problems peculiar to the Defense
Department staff arise from the fact that it combines two
separate career services: the professional military and the
Civil Service, Effective operations depend upon close coopera-
tion between these two professional staffs based on nsutual
respect and confidence.
The morale and motivation of those serving in the
Defense Department is conditioned by events occurring; both
within and outside the Department . Interservlce conflicts
when based on narrow viewpoints and no attempt for open, con-
structive objectivity, whether over strategic concepts or
defense policies, not only inhibit effective Joint planning
and action but also fragment and narrow loyalties and damage
the common basis of morale which must undergird an effective
military establishment. The additional layers of civilian staffs
which have been superimposed upon the military staffs by
1963.
"•"Planners for the Pentagon," Business Week, 13 July
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unification tend further to separate the professional military
from the top civilian Defense authorities in terms of flow of
command and information and in terms of the mutual confidence
essential to the effective development of a successful Defense
Establishment. The recurrent oonfuslon concerning economy and
austerity generated by drives to economize at the expense of
the people in the service also inevitably weakens morale at
every level: the career personnel normally suffer the extra
burdens imposed. This is especially true when dollar economizing
directly affects manpower levels,! for example:
Naval discharge centers are reportedly swamped
with sailors headed for civilian life as a result of
the three-month-early release program announced last
week in an economy measure.
Altogether some 17,000 Kavy men are eligible to
eet out of the service up to three months early under
the terms of the program.
The early-out program has drawn a lot of fire from
fleet commanders and ship skippers faced with the
necessity of operating their forces with badly depleted
crews. One carrier is reportedly losing over *IQ0 men
and faces a heavy employment schedule with no replacements
in sipht until after July 1.
To minimise such crippling losses and to salvage as
many trained men for the Navy as possible, the Bureau
of Naval Personnel is using: all possible means to try
to re-enlist maximum numbers of the better qualified
dischargees. In short, the Navy finds itself in the
position of trying to retain many of those it feels it
must lose in order to stay within alloted funds.
1
Such intangibles as morale, service pride, and Job
satisfaction do have a bearing on retention, detention problems
primarily seem to be the result of strains put upon family life
by the requirements of the military profession. Undoubtedly
pay is another key factor; this directly affects every member of
1llavy Times
. 1 April 1964, p. 1.
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the military. The real income of field grade and general
officers has suffered a 50& decline over the past *I0 years.
The individual in the service who is told he cannot expect pay
increases because efforts to make military service financially
as appealing as civilian life might put an intolerable burden on
the Treasury naturally reacts with some bitterness.
There is some evidence to the effect that over-centrali-
zation , over-layering, and the disheartening complexities of
staff operations tend to reduce the sense of accomplishment of
many. The net result has been to make military service less
attractive, particularly among officers assigned to higher
level service staffs or to Joint staffs.
Leadership is a critical requirement for national
security.
If civilian control over the world's largest business
is to be exercised In a manner which produces realistic and
effective decisions on the crucial issues of defense policy, the
top civilian positions must be filled with capable and qualified
personnel. Experience has revealed that it has been difficult
both to secure Defense Department civilians who have adequate
experience and knowledge for the top political positions and to
retain them long enough so they can fully comprehend the problems
at hand and to follow through on policies and programs which
they might initiate. With such notable exceptions as Wilfred
J» McHeil who was Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
Vintner, loc. cit ., p. 16*1.
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the average tenure of the top civilian political officials has
been about 18 months.
As pointed out by the Cordiner Committee, the broader
opportunities and higher financial returns of private industry
have contributed to an extraordinary exodus of highly qualified
career military and civilian personnel from the Defense Depart-
ment.
The problem of obtaining sufficient qualified civilian
manpower for the Defense Department Is to a great extent part
of the over-all problem of attracting and retaining civilian
personnel for government service as a whole. The survey by the
Cordiner Committee discovered that the losses of older, exper-
ienced career Civil Service personnel were aggravated by the
fact that the Input of new college graduates at the professional
starting level was inadequate In quantity and quality. In the
field of top-level career civilians it noted that turnover was
increasing, quality was decreasing, and many positions were
remaining unfilled.
Causes of these difficulties were traced by the Cordiner
Committee tc the Inadequacy of three basic Incentives • Although
the Defense Department mission offered real meaning to the work
of the top-level career civilians, there were inadequacies in
ccmpensation, prestige, and chances for personal Improvement.
1
Report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional
and Technical Compensation , Vol. ii m Civilian Personnel.
Washington: 6. P. 0., 19^)7) , p. **•
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The system of cogens at ion for civil servants lacked
the flexibility and response to competitive pressures which
characterise the industrial system. The Cordiner Report showed
that the pay of scientists, professionals, and managerial
personnel was 152 to 20% higher in industry than in government.
In the area of personal improvemerit and opportunity for
advancement the Cordiner Committee reported that, while high-
quality programs for the improvement and training of civilian
technicians and supervisors had been developed in the Defense
Department, comparable attention had not been given to the needs
of senior civilian executives at the level of OS-12 and above.
The need for greater recognition in personnel programs towards
maintaining the prestige of senior Civil Service officials on a
comparable basis with their counterparts in non-governmental
occupations was also noted.
These career civilian personnel problems had previously
been pointed out by the Hoover Commission as deserving particular
attention. Among other points, the Hoover Commission recommended
continued study and adjustment of the compensation system in
terms of the civilian economy and also the comparable positions
outside government; the need for more adequate career opportuni-
ties which would challenge civilians to earn advancement to
higher positions; increased training of promising civilian
executives, both within the Defense Department and at outside
1




The Cordlner Committee supported yet another recommends-
tion of the 1955 Hoover Commission Task Force: that there be
established a Senior Civil Service. The Senior Civil Service
was to be composed of those career civil servants of the highest
qualifications in terras of experience, training, and capabilities
Individuals would be selected for this category at the pinnacle
of the career ladder on a limited and highly selective basis.
In short, it would represent an "elite corps" of top-level civil
servants who had outstanding competence and broad experience.
They would not be directly associated with any one agency but
would be assigned from time to time to various agencies to
perform specific tasks of particular difficulty or importance.
There is much that the Defense Department can do to
enhance the loyalty and the sense of purpose of individuals
serving therein. Effective control can be attained with a
minimum of effort where the organisation is comprised of
capable, knowledgeable personnel imbued with loyalty and a
devotion towards accomplishing the organisation's objectives.
The Defense Department should constantly strive to make
optimum utilisation of that most valuable of all resources,
skilled and competent manpower; for military manpower forma the
Commission on Organisation of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Special Personnel Problems *n
_^f T)epsrtment
of Defense (Washington: dovernraent Printing Office, 195!>)« '
^Classroom presentation by Dr. Karl B. Strorasera, The
George Washington University, 18 March 196*».
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heart of the combat organisation, and civilian management assumes
the key role for effective management.
The power of the purse has importance as an instrument
of civilian control over the military. The Military policy
for the nation ia largely shaped by Congress not by the armed
services. This is so because Congress controls the appropria-
tions t which in the final analysis control the military policy.
The Appropriations Committees are essentially recommend*
military policy to Congress when submitting budget proposals,
for the military plans must be reshaped within the defense
budget allowed.
The truth is, however, that one cannot properly draw up
defense plans on the basis of either cost alone or needs alone.
There is no specific budget sisse or cost that is correct for
all conditions, national security, from the point of view of
the economist, might be regarded as one big economic problem
which depends on:
1, The quantity of a national resources available,
now and in the future,
2, The proportion of these resources allocated
to national security purposes,
3, The efficiency with which the resources so
allocated are used.
1
Elias Kusar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca, H, Y,
:
Cornell University Press, i$>0).
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Charles J, Hitch and Foland M. KeKean, The Economics
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There has to be continuity between organization and
programs. Money must flow in accordance with the decisions of
management. To have control of the programs, managers should
have control of the money. The development of a financial
management system with the organizational patterns and procedures
relating to fiscal accountability and management controls for
assuring the proper allocation with maximum efficiency of





One of the valuable functions that the U. S. Chiefs of
Staff should perform in time of peace is the development of a
balanced military program in which budgetary requirements are
thoroughly integrated.
The defense budget should be a translation into dollars
of the military strategy upon which our future security will
depend. Since the funds it provides will include the military
programs several years into the future, the budget in effect
controls the freedom of decision and action of our leaders over
a similarly lonpe period.
The formation of a modern military machine capable of
keeping the peace has meant that coordination has been necessary
among the military planner, the foreirm policy expert, the
scientist, the financial wizard, the weapons designer and the
loristics authority.
The cyclical differences between schedules for budget
presentation and those for the development of national policy and
military strategy have in the past been one of the ma,1or causes
of delay, confusion, and duplication of effort which has
ch »rizert some of the Defense Department operations. Problems
*Tay lor , loc. cit
. , p . xi
.
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of coordination between financial and military planners in the
preparation of a unified defense budget began immediately with
the inception of the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense
Forrestal and his subordinates conducted their budget-making
under ceilings established by the Bureau of the Budget under
Presidential direction. As an example , after the Communist coup
in Chechoslovakia in February 19^8, the President called for a
supplemental defense budget. Forrestal failed to pass on to the
Joint Chiefs the Presidential ceiling of $3 billion, Unguided
the Chiefs came up with a total supplement of $9 billion by
adding up the necessary minimum total each service claimed it
needed. Secretary Forrestal reduced the Defense Department
supplement to $3«*t8 billion. The Director of the Budget, James
&* Webb, recommended $3*17 billion as a maximum figure, but
preferred $2.5 billion, in order that future defense budgets
would not get out cf line. President Truman accepted the $3«^8
billion. No mutual exchange of .Judgments occurred between
Secretary Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs. The Secretary had
played the role of the politically-responsible executive balanc-
ing the experts 1 judgments against the broader interests of
public policy. Mr. Forrestal had seemingly picked an arbitrary
figure, although economically Justifying it. He was trapped by
circumstances; the Chiefs 1 refusal to consider economic factors,
his own troubled feelings about the magnitude of defense expendi-
tures, and the prevalence cf the belief as reflected by the
White House that a specific ceiling could be set for defense
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expenditures and that if the ceiling were exceeded the economy
would gradually go to ruin. Political considerations were
uppermost. Within a month the President had imposed a ceiling
for the next regular budget, fiscal 1950, apparently without
consulting either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National
Security Council. ^eld to hia figure of $14.4 billion
despite Secretary Forrestal's every effort to Increase it.
Mr. Forrestal's second attempt at budget-making as
Secretary of Defense net with slightly greater success in dealing
with the Joint Chiefs, but less in dealing with the President.
At Secretary Forrest al # s request, the Chiefs agreed to divide
the $14.4 billion allocated them for fiscal 1950. In doing so
they came up with an aggregate figure of $30 billion. After
much work the budget was reduced to $16.9 billion. However the
President would not yield from his original ceiling. Once again,
Mr. Forrestal had played a constructive role as an intermediary
between the Wnite House and the Joint Chiefs.
A serious weakness in the Defense Department as exposed
by the reverses suffered in the Korean War was the lack of
sufficient ready army and tactical air forces. This shortcoming
revealed a failure to correlate adequately the strategic require-
ments , the budget process, and the costs. The necessary balance
between economy of operations and optimum readiness of essential
forces had not been achieved.
1
Satauel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. ^4$.
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Although that failure indicated ineffective operation
of the Defense organization, it could be attributed to Incorrect
policy decisions by the responsible political authorities of
the government, not merely in the Pentagon but in the entire
Executive Branch and in Congress as well. Heliance on strategic
airpower and massive nuclear weapons as the primary expression
of American military power had led to the neglect of conventional
military forces. Further, the economy-minded administration
had fixed the fiscal 1950 budget ceiling under which the Joint
Chiefs of Staff could merely recommend allocations to the
services of that amount available, and Congress had deemed a
$14.4 billion budget fully adequate.
From the outbreak of the Korean conflict in June 1950
until the end of fiscal 1952, the Army grew from 10 divisions
and 11 regimental combat teams (all at less than peacetime
manning levels and without operational support units) to 20
divisions and 18 regimental combat teams—an increase in military
personnel of about one million. The Navy expanded in number of
personnel from 400,000 to 800,000 and its in-commission warships
from 200 to 400, doubling the number of carriers and adding
seven carrier air groups. The Marine Corps increased from 75,000
men to 230,000, The Air Force grew from 48 groups to 95 wings
with a planned goal of 143 wings and increased its total military
personnel from 400,000 to a strength of 980,000. Defense appro-
priations rose from the $14,4 billion level for fiscal 1950 to
$48,2 billion for fiscal 1951, $60.4 billion for fiscal 1952,
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and 1*7 billion for fiscal 1953. 1
Economizing without the benefit of integrated strategic
and logistical guidelines turned defense policy into business
management but resulted in a level of preparedness below the
actual requirements of cold war conditions.
The more the defense Department is management-oriented,
the more important it is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide
coherent leadership in the development of military policy.
The second Hoover Commission acknowledged the growing
effectiveness of business management methods in the Defense
Department particularly fiscal controls, but the continuing
inadequacy of policy guidance. The Task Force on National
Security Organization, chaired by Ferdinand Eberstadt, abandoned
further consideration at the top for establishing strong, clear
guidelines for the integration of military strategic require-
ments and budget estimates and turned instead to unifi cation
at lower levels primarily through fiscal means. Areas of possible
economy were identified as:
1. Savings resulting from a sound relationship
between our national policy needs and our military
strength.
2. Improvements in methods of doing business in
the military establishment,
3. Elimination of excessive duplications.
1
Kintner, loc. cit., p. $0.
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As a result of the strong Hoover Commission recommenda-
tions and also a House of net)resent atives» bill on financial
management, a new Title IV was added to the National Security
Act and was entitled "Promotion of Economy and Efficiency through
Establishment of Uniform Budgetary and fiscal Procedures and
Organizations." following approval of the amendments to the
National Security Act as passed on 2 August 19**9 , the Secretary
of Defense became principal assistant to the President on nation-
al defense and was given:
1, A Deputy Secretary and three Assistant Secretaries
2, Direction, authority and control over the
Department of Defense
3, Control of the budget and of funds
In addition, the amendments provided for: establishing
a non-voting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and depriving
the service department Secretaries of cabinet status.
Title IV spelled out in considerable detail the nature
of fiscal and budgetary procedures to be developed within the
Defense Department, emphasizing the "performance budget" and
providing that a comptroller be added to each of the three
military departments and that one of the three newly-created
Assistant Secretaries of Defense assume the function of
comptroller for the Department as a whole.
During the Korean War the requirements and appropriations
Vintner, loc« cit.. p. 37.
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derived from the force levels remained unreasonable. The
Initial estimates for the defense budget for fiscal 1952
aggregated approximately $103 billion. It thus fell to the
civilians In the Office of the Secretary of Defense to unify
the defense budgets , rather than by strategy derived by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Comptroller's blue pencil achieved
consolidation of programs. 3.
Considering the scope of the problems upon which the
Joint Chiefs of Staff must make decisions and the many functions
for which they are responsible to provide guidance and advice 9
it Is interesting to note their responsibility in regards to
the defense budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged to:
Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense
,
for information and consideration In connection with
preparation of budgets, statements of military require-
ments based upon U. S. strategic considerations, current
national security policy and strategic war plans. These
statements of requirements shall Include tasks, priority
of tasks, force requirements and general strategic
guidance for development of military installations
and bases for equipping and maintaining military forces. 2
The Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body take no part in
the actual formulation of the budget. This fact has surprised
Congress, which normally expects the Chiefs of Staff to give
them competent advice on the budget.
Prior to 195 9 » the Office of the Secretary of Defense
1
Hammond, loc. clt . a p. 253*
2
Armed Forces ?4anagement» November 1962, p. 55.
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and the Joint Chiefs of Staff set guidelines for the annual
budget* This information set the general program for eaoh
service department. The budget estimates then came up to the
service Secretary from within their military staffs* The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Financial Management would
review the budget from the standpoint of efficiency, but not
for major programs* The policy guidance needed for making the
budget estimates usually came from the military Chief of the
department. The service Secretary was thus presented with a
budget already agreed to by his major assistants* Review was
difficult so was not normally comprehensively conducted by the
service Secretary. As a result, the first really independent
review of the budget occurred in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense* Each service produced its budget in Isolation from
the others*
As General Taylor stated:
Although many earnest discussions of uni-service
needs took place between the Secretary of Defense, the
departmental Secretaries and their Chiefs of Staff,
at no time to ray knowledge were the three service
budgets put side by side and an appraisal made of
the fighting capability of the aggregate military
forces as supported by the budget* This so-called
"vertical*' approach to budget building has many defects
and accounts in a large measure for the inability thus
far to develop a budget which keeps fiscal emphasis in
phase with military priorities* It is not an exaggeration
to say that nobody knows what we are actually buying
with any specific budget* 2
Hammond, loo, clt *. p* 297*
Taylor, loc. clt *. p. 70.
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In budpet-makinp", as on other administrative functions
which involve important policy matters , the service Secretary
has been faced on the one hand with the advice of his func-
tionally-oriented civilian managers , who tend to be neutrals
when it comes to the larger policy issues; and on the other,
by the highly centralised military command and staff organiza-
tion headed by his military Chief, which is primarily oriented
towards cohesive military planning, programming, and operating.
Beginning in late 1959* under Socretary of Defense Gates who
understood the problem having previously served as Secretary of
the Navy, more attention was given towards bringing the service
Secretaries into the annual budget review process as carried
out in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
In the case of the Defense Department Comptroller as
with nearly all organizational comptrollers, or controllers,
it is difficult to separate the power of the particular office
from the capabilities of the incumbent. Kr. McNeil, as Defense
Department Comptroller, from the beginning and throughout his
more than ten-year tenure specialized In fiscal and budgetary
matters. In 1958 Congressional investigations of military
research and development produced evidence that the Comptroller
exercised considerable control over the services beyond what
was regarded as a comptrolling ftinotion. In referring to his
staff expert on research and development budgets, Mr. McNeil
1
Hammond, loc. clt . . p. 297.
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In 1958 Illustrated the ease with which the Comptroller crosses
the line from an advisory status Into the shaping of Important
operational decisions:
He works with the Director of Guided Missiles and
members of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. As
a result , he hears when some aeronautics or electronics
project or program is considered impractical. That
doesn't mean that we make a decision. But if coming
through a separate channel, there is listed in the next
budget, let us say, substantial sums for something that
the people in charge of research consider to be not
worthwhile, we certainly will pet to the research people
and get the right answer. Now, I haven't said "no" to
that program, because that would be going* beyond anything
X or anybody in my position should do. Since one of the
major questions in the research and development field
concerns the decision when to give up a program, the
Comptroller can play an important role and can be a
powerful influence upon policy in requiring justification
for the continuance of a program concerning which he has,
or has not, derogatory information.
1
Although law did not make specific provision for budget
review by the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal soon became
involved. Next, largely through Title IV, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense obtained power extending to the laying of
budgetary guidelines, the review of estimates and the dlsbursal
of appropriated funds; the Joint Chiefs of Staff were restricted
at the same time to the establishment of force estimates for use
in budget-making. The Secretary of Defense through the use of
budget guidelines became the true artisan of our military
strategy. This setting of guidelines was not an arbitrary
action on his part, but one to which he had been impelled in





the directives of the Bureau of the Budget. There was a serious
prap in that no procedure existed for relating in a formal manner
the military requirements, programs, and budget. The interlock-
ing of these three factors was accomplished within each depart-
ment with respect to its own service budget but there was no
adequate procedure to perform this function of correlation at
the Defense Department level. As a consequence, the military
strategy was a result of administrative and budgetary happen-
stance rather than an analytical appraisal of our military
requirements and a scientific budget formulation directed at
supporting these requirements. Each year the existing military
programs were projected forward by one more budget increment,
following the same direction given it by budgetary actions of
previous years. The programs proceeded by inertial guidance
with little or no "command control" to reorient them to changing
world conditions. The determination of U. S, strategy had become
more or less an incidental by-product of the administrative
processes of the defense budget.
The over-all responsibility for the approval and imple-
mentation of our national security policy falls to the President,
He is assisted by two advisory bodies, the National Security
Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Members of the National
Security Council include the President, Vice President, Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Office of
1
Taylor, loc, clt, , p, 128,
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Emergency Planning; In addition, other representatives—
Attorney General, Director of the Budget Bureau, Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of the Treasury,
Presidential Special Assistants, Chairman of the Joint Staff—
may attend Council meetings.
The composition of the National Security Council Is
such that It gathers together the requisite knowledge and
experience in the political, economic, psychological, and
military fields to permit the broad determination of national
objectives and policy. The Council members advise the President
as individuals in their own right rather than as representatives
of their respective departments or agencies. Prom their back-
ground of experience it is expected that they will seek defi-
nitive, statesman-like solutions to the problems of security
rather than accept solutions which are merely compromises of
departmental points of view.
Perhaps the most important action of the National
Security Council is the annual review of the "Basic National
Security Policy 1* • This is the paper which undertakes to provide
the broad policy guidance for all governmental agencies involved
in national defense* This document of about 25 pages contains
a broad outline of the aims of 0, S. national stratepy and a
more detailed description of the military, political, economic,
and domestic elements to support the overfall national strategy.
1




It Includes no estimate of the finances necessary to Implement
the recommended policy and thus has no direct tie-in with the
formulation of the Federal budget* In its final approved form,
the "Basic National Security Policy" should be the blueprint
for the departmental security programs and should provide the
Joint Chiefs of Staff with the basis for their straterie
planning. However, such is not normally the case. The document
is so broad in nature and so general in language as to provide
limited guidance in practical application. The final text
permits many different interpretations. The document, thus,
means all things to all people and settles nothing.
The document produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which
is comparable to the "Basic National Security Plan" is called
the "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan". It provides planning
guidance for the development of the forces needed in the fiscal
year five years hence. It estimates the military requirements
for cold, limited, or general war and includes a determination
of the military forces together with their dispositions and
employment necessary to implement the military strategy derived
from the "Basic National Security Policy". It also provides
guidance for service mobilisation planning and serves as a basis
for the annual statement on military requirements to assist the
Secretary of Defense in developing budgetary guidance for the
next fiscal year.
1
Taylor, loc. cit. » p. 82.
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In its usual format, the "Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan* contains an intelligence evaluation of the military
threat in the period under consideration, a strategic concept
for the conduct of war, a logistics annex, and a tabulation of
forces required to support the strategic concept. It has been
the development of the latter, so-called "force tabs", which
has generated a great divergence of views within the Joint
Chiefs of Staff*
The "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan" is intended to
be an important document for the orderly development of military
programs* In the past, It has had difficulties in application*
A primary cause of failure has been the inability of the Chiefs
of Staff to agree on the best combination of forces supportable
by the financial outlays which the Secretary of Defense has
considered feasible for planning* Because of their awareness
that the budgetary rewards were in the field of strategic
striking power, the services have tended to emphasize that part
of their mission which approximated long-range warfare.
In periods of budgetary plenty, as between 1951 and 195*J,
each service would tend to build up the weapons systems it
considered appropriate for its mission without much concern with
doctrinal harmony or overlapping functions* In periods of
relative budgetary scarcity, it would lead to bitter rivalry
over the assignment of missions*
II —»— —
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The connection between the primary mission and budgetary
rewards impelled the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the best of
intentions, to become essentially advocates of each's service
point of view. There was little in the organization of the
Defense Establishment to impel the service Chiefs in a spon-
taneous fashion to consider over-all strategic doctrine.
Another factor inhibiting the development of strategic
doctrine was the predominance of fiscal considerations in our
defense planning. By giving priority to cost over requirements,
technology subordinated doctrine. Budget requests were not
formulated in the light of strategic doctrine. Rather doctrine
was tailored to fit budget requests. The predominance of fiscal
considerations resulted in doctrinal rigidity because it caused
each service to be afraid that a change in doctrine might lead
to a cut in appropriations. As a result, budgetary pressures
compounded the conservatism of the military and encouraged
p
a subtle forr* of waste.
Although the fiscal function is supposed to be an
instrument of raanagenient control, it has also been a standard
of control.
National policy should be feasible. The translation
of national policy into military plans, according to the former
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, will be one of the
1
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biggest problems facing the Department of Defense for many
years to coa*. 1
The fixed defense budget, by accentuating the inter-
service struggle for funds, became a prime cause of the service
rivalry which was undermining national confidence in our military
2
programs*
As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, President
* Kennedy reversed the policy of using a budgetary ceiling as
the primary element of defense planning and applied the military
strength needed as a basic measuring rod. He asked for the
fiscal increases this policy required, however unpopular the
action might prove. In 1963# President Kennedy said, "There is
no discount price on defense."'*
The second Hoover Commission Task Force on Procurement
concluded that the key to more effective planning rests with
the Secretary of Defense himself. He has the responsibility
for the overall activities of the Department of Defense and has
ftthe authority necessary to carry out the responsibility.
Changes came rapidly when Robert S. McMamara assumed
leadership in the Defense Department as the seventh Secretary
1
Armed Forces Management . November 196 1, p. 7^.
2
Taylor, loc. clt ., p. 105.
3
Air Force and Space Digest . February 196M , p. 16.
h
Hammond, loc. cit.» p. 318.

55
of Defense and began to streamline the Pentagon organisation
and procedures. As stated by the former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Gllpatric:
The purpose of present reorganisation moves Is
not necessarily to give the Secretary more control
(the power of the purse by Itself Is pretty damned
potent), but to give him the Information he needs to
ke decisions and to get prompt decisions to problems
further down the chain of command.
The big chance Is that the Secretary of Defense now
utilises the powers of that office—some thing that had
to happen before there could be a unified approach to
defense problems.
When the program package system frets going the
Secretary will be provided with more of the information
he needs to make decisions. • • the Budget can be changed
from an oppressive document into a creative and dynamic
one.-*-
A key man in the "common sense" method of formulating
a budget which was to reveal the costing of alternative weapons
systems was an ex-RAKD economist and now Assistant Defense
Secretary, Charles J. Hitch. Encouraged by the Secretary of
Defense, he expanded his Job beyond the Defense Comptroller's
conventional chores.
Assistant Secretary Hitch's military budgeting plan has
overhauled the entire Defense Department's decision-making
machinery. Funds are now allocated by military mission or
function, not by service. The budget Is planned not in terms
of Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, but of strategic
nuclear striking forces, tactical war forces, air defense, and
the like. There are five-year cost projections for major defense
1
Armed Forces Management. November 1961, p. 26.
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programs, to point out the long-term implications of deciding,
say, which missile or airplane to purchase in quantity • The
plan is designed for making an analytical, rational allocation
of resources to buy defense.
In effect, the economists* tools of analysis have been
put to work in the Pentagon. Emphasis on "quantifying" defense
decisions has stirred up grumbling among the military by
questions, such as: What is the relative cost of producing
and deploying one missile system as compared to a competitive
system? What is the ratio of cost to operational effectiveness?
The result has been the greatest degree of military unification
yet and a rapid standardizing and consolidating of military
operations at all levels.
The new budgeting plan was designed to show the full
time-phased costs of proposed programs and to provide the data
needed to assess properly the cost and effectiveness of alternate
programs
•
The first phase of the plan began in Kerch 1961. The
Secretary assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services,
and various offices of the Defense Department specific projects
dealing with various requirements to be established by military-
economic studies in comparing alternative ways for accomplishing
national security objectives and also attempting to determine
the one which accomplishes the most for a given cost or achieves
1




a given objective at the leaet coat*
The second phase began in May 1961 when guidance was
given to the military departments for the development and
submission of program data* Departments were asked to submit
proposals for any additional forces and new programs, as
projected through 1970 when possible* which were required to
support U. S* basic national security policy. They were parti-
cularly encouraged to submit alternative forces and programs so
the Secretary of Defense, in reaching his decisions* could have
the principal choices available in achieving the national
security objectives. Total costs of each proposed program was
shown for at least the next five years. Together with his staff
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary reviewed the
summaries which presented key data In the principal decisional
areas and in mid-September Issued guidance for the fiscal years
1963 through 19&7 in terms of forces and costs.
The third phase was the translation of program
decisions into the traditional budget format.
The standardised list of programs developed by the
Coiapt roller in conjunction with the Joint Staff and the military
departments is based on an interrelated grouping of program
elements which have a common mission. The following listings
of programs and of categories for the annual appropriations
1
Armed Forces Management * December 196l» P. 9?.
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budget show the dissimilarity between the two: 1
PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS CATEGORIES
Strategic Retaliatory Forces Military Personnel
Continental Air and Missile
Defense Forces Operation and Maintenance
General Purpose Forces Procurement
Airlift and Seal! ft Forces Military Construction
Reserve and Guard Forces Civil Defense
Research end Development
(including Space) Military Assistance
General Support Revolving and Management Funds
Research, Development , Test
and Evaluation
As each year passes
,
program and requirements projections
are made for another year, thus allowing the Defense Department
to keep at least five years beyond the current budget year.
At all times, there is a tentatively approved program, fully
eosted, and projected at least five years into the future, to
serve as a planning guide. This then is the so-called Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Plan.
Flexibility has been built into the Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Plan by means of the Program Change
Control System as introduced in 1961. As requested changes in
programs are approved by the Secretary of Defense, the current
Force Structure and Financial Plan is revised and updated monthly
so it serves as the continuing base plan for the military
Vrhe World Almanac. 1963 # p. 7^0.
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departments, A program change proposal may originate within
a service or It may come from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, or one of its component agencies. Service Secretaries
do have the authority to approve certain proposed changes. When
the Secretary of Defense calls for the annual budget, the mili-
tary departments develop the required budgetary documentation
from the program for the budget year of the approved Five Year
Perce Structure and Financial Plan.
The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan is the beginning
point for planning by the Secretary of Defense and is the basic
document from which service planners obtain their guidelines
for developing inputs to the Five Year Force Structure and
Financial Plan,
A sample timetable for formulation of an annual Defense
p
Department budget might be similar to the following:
15 May ------------- tentative budget prepared
based on the Force Structure
and Financial Plan
15 Way until 1 August ----- program change proposals
submitted for approval and
reclama conducted
1 August until 1 October - - - - finalizing and preparing of
services' budgets
1 October ----------- detailed services' budgets
submitted to the Secretary
of Defense
1 December ----------- final Defense budget completed
XNavy Budget Digest (WAVEXOS P-1355), 31 December 1963,
p, 27«
2 Classroom presentation by Charles J, Hitch, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Financial Management, The George
Washington University, 25 February 1964,
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This single , Integrated planning-prograraming-budgeting
process allows the Defense Department to;
1. Plan and review requirements.
2. Formulate and review programs which extend
several years into the future,
3. Develop annual budget estimates*
Such an integrated process has had widespread ramifica-
tions mainly because it does attempt to provide a comprehensive
system for planning and controlllnp ma* or programs which deter-
mine overall 0, S. military strength.
Por Defense Department planners, immediate advantages
of the integrated process were to?
1. Provide for more orderly, continuous program
review in contrast to the hectic program-budget review
of the past which was crammed into a few weeks.
2. Disclose the full financial implications of
program decisions.
3. Keep future military planning in rough balance
with probable resources and dollar availability.
*t. Promote unified, balanced overall Defense programs
In place of unilaterally balanced Array, Mavy, and Air
Force programs.
*
Thus an integrated reporting system is in effect to
provide the reliable cost and program data needed to assess
properly the progress and status of each of the programs and








terms and in financial terms. It must and does serve many
financial purposes, such as: 1
1. Produce a budget in a form acceptable to Congress*
2. Account for funds in the same manner in which
they are appropriated,
3. Provide managers at all levels in the Defense
Department that financial information needed to do their
particular Jobs in an efficient and economical manner.
4. Produce the financial information required by
other governmental agencies*
5. Provide top management with essential data in
terms of programs for making the crucial decisions to
carry out the principal missions of the Defense Establishment.
The Secretary of Defense has a financial management
system oriented to the manner in which he has to make decisions—
by program in relation to military mission. Even though controls
are aimed primarily at coordination of effort within the Defense
Department and at improvement in national military posture, the
Defense Comptroller's activities extend beyond these standard
2boundaries. But as Mr. Hitch has stated:
Secretary Mcfiamara wants detail for knowing how
we 1 re roinp to ret there in every decision he mekes.
The Comptroller's office is going to make every effort
to produce a program that blueprints his trip.
The Comptroller thus assists the Secretary of Defense
by acting as a coordinator for the collection, classification,
analysis, interpretation, reporting and distribution of
operational data in financial terms for planning purposes. His
Armed Forces Management . December 1961, p. 98.
^Armed Forces KanaKement
.
November 1962, p. 90.
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office serves as an information center for decision-making*
The programming concept requires the establishment of a
communications network which will transmit information rapidly
and efficiently to the various levels of management where
1decisions are made.
1
George KozmetsRy and Paul Kircher, Electronic Computers
and Management Control (Mew York! McGraw-Hill Book Company.




Administration is dependent, for its very existence as
well as its success, upon communi cations. The administrative
process is primarily one of communications: receiving, evaluat-
ing, and transmitting information. Decision-makers deal almost
exclusively with information. While information as such does
not control, it is needed by decision-makers as a guide to
actions which do control.
Timing is most important in decision-making. Many
variables enter the picture when determining the proper time
for a decision. Sometimes there is a need for a decision
regardless of whether the desired amount of study has taken
place. Sometimes decisions must be made promptly, other times
deliberately. Varying circumstances necessitate a flexibility
in planning.
As former President Kennedy once said:^
Thayer, loc. cit ,» p. 80,
2
Perrin Stryker, "How the Executive Makes Up His
Wind," Fortune , April i960.
3Senator John P. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace , edited





In Washington, ae elsewhere, the "urgent* is often
the enemy of the "Important" • The need for decision
and action on immediate crises too frequently seems
to preclude the serious, careful study of fundamental
and long-range problems that is so essential to
foresighted leadership. Then the neglected problems
of the future suddenly arise in their true Importance
and become the new urgencies to which we must quickly
respond, generally with improvisations that are too
little and too late*
Two new problems are of ascending Importance today in
military and political considerations: Can the wisest political
decisions and the proper military decisions be made in sufficient
time for the employment of today's super aerospace weapons?
Can these weapons be precisely controlled in the execution of
those decisions? These are the questions which go to the heart
of what is called "command and control".
The essence of commanding is the making of decisions*
For the commander of an operational command, the vital decisions
are those dealing with the operational employment of weapons
and forces. During the past five years, there has been a grow-
ing awareness at the highest decision-making levels of the need
for a more rapid and reliable communications system to aid the
decision-makers* "Hot lines" and ^red phones" have become
familiar nomenclature to commanders on a world-wide basis* A
former commander of the Strategic Air Command has stated:
"Military operations and military communications are integral
and inseparable. Without communications I command only my
desk."
Wd rore., n*n»—.nt . July 1962. p. 58.
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A command and control system Is a communication system.
The inseparability of communications, command and control Is
becoming an increasingly recognized principle and has been
referred to as the W C^ principle". Command and control systems
provide the key to effective decision-making for the employment
of modern weapons and forces by utilizing complex electronic
evaluation and response machinery for gathering, analyzing and
presenting the necessary data. To make these decisions a
commander requires vast amounts of information about such things
as the status, location, and readiness of his personnel and
weapons systems as well as similar information about the capa-
bilities, activities and state of preparedness of his enemies.
Electronic sensors, such as radars, gather some of this informa-
tion* Computers sift it, analyze it, and often display it.
The data gathering, data processing, data display and declsion-
making steps make up the terra "command 1
.
The "control* side covers the translation of those
decisions into operational orders which are electronioally
relayed to the weapons and forces, or the carrying out of the
decision.
There are two major elements of a command and control
systems^
X
"Robert G. Pfefferkom, "Taylor 1 s Flexible Response
Strategy Shifts C & C Perspective," Armed Forces Elanacement »
July 1963, p. 35.
2MaJ. General C. H. Terhune, Jr., Data . March 1963, p. 10.




1. The structural part of the system Is the
commander's staff, the organization he imposes on the
staff, and the procedures and doctrines he has the
staff follow in order to support him in making decisions.
2. Tii a technical part of the system is the communica-
tions equipment, the computers, other technical aids,
and the specialists who operate it.
The field of modern-day command and control is also
often referred to as "cybernetics" • In originating the terra
"cybernetics* Horbert Wiener stated?
The physical functioning of the living individual
and the operation of some of the newer communication
machines are precisely parallel in their analogous
attempts to control entropy through feedback (the method
of controllinr a system by reinserting into it the results
of its past performance). Both of them have sensory
receptors as one stage in their cycle of operation.
*
The group of scientists about Dr. Kosenblueth and
myself had already become aware of the essentiel unity
of the set of problems centering about communications,
control, and statistical mechanics, whether in the machine
or in living tissue. We have decided to call the entire
field of control and communications theory, whether in
the machine or in the animal, by the name "cybernetics",
or steersman.
2
Cybernated systems perform with a precision and a
rapidity unmatched in humans. Data processing by electronic
computers ha© many uses. The timely processing of information
permits management by exception. Management need concern itself
only with those instances when the performance does not meet
the programmed standards. Thus, automation takes over the
1
Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beinrs ?
Cybernetics and Society (Mew York: Doubleday * Compeny, Inc.,
1^), p. 2b.
2




huge burden of routine administration. The characteristics of
a computer wake possible an enormous increase in the amount of
information consumed, in the range of alternatives explored,
and in the speed and accuracy of obtainable information, Auto-
mation increases the effectiveness of management control when
used intelligently. It also reduces the number of clerical
staff personnel and the physical volume of paper; these alone
facilitate control. As Wernher von Braun has remarked: "We
can lick gravity but sometimes the paperwork is overwhelming,"
Cybernetics permit management to construct mathematical
models in advance that incorporate the significant variables
of a complex problem. It is, as a result, possible for manage-
ment to do a better job of coordinating various aspects of
operations and of assassin? the various alternatives prior to
making the final decision.
By eliminating redundant information, by comparing and
screening data, by sorting and programming bits of intelligence,
a commander or manager is able to have an overwhelming amount
of facts reduced to manageable proportions upon which he can
base sound decisions.
Cybernation thus gives management a much clearer picture
of the overall operation and also permits much greater ration-
alization of managerial activities.
The paramount importance of communications between the
1
Walter Buckingham, Automation; Its Impact on Business
and People (New York: Harper & Brothers, l^bl), p. 17.
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commander and the weapons delivery forces has long been recog-
nized. Noone has yet been willing to do much about delegating
command and control of the nation's entire military forces to
an electronic computer in a completely automatic data processing:
environment, A digital computer requires absolutely precise
instructions for every step it takes or for every operation it
performs. A computer will not solve a problem which cannot be
stated unambiguously. It has none of the abilities customarily
associated with human intellect. It has no power to formulate
or to recognize problems and Is incapable of making decisions
on the basis of Incomplete and inconsistent data* a character-
istic ability of the human mind. A computer, in short, has no
Judgment,
However there are fewer and fewer alternatives to fully-
automated warfare. By the time the key man is briefed, makes
his deliberation and reaches a decision, the need for the
decision could be past history. The Importance of an electronic
data processing system approaches the importance of the weapons
systems as the maximum allowance time for the decision-making
process approaches zero.
In adapting automatic data processing to a national
command and control system there is the principle of centralized
versus decentralized use of decision-making data. The nature
and extent of reporting by a decentralized unit to headquarters
1
Richard Bellman, "Computers and Decision Making,"
Computers and Automation , January 1963*
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la an area of continued conjecture and debate* The philosophy
or decentralization assumes delegation of decision-making to
the field units. This philosophy is an extremely attractive one.
The man on the scene has intimate first-hand knowledge of many
factors relevant to making any decisions and can act quickly
and flexibly. Large hierarchical organizations, on the other
hand, tend to be sluggish and restricted by rules and regula-
tions. Much of the time and energy is spent in attempting to
assemble that very information which is so readily available to
the local corn ander. Since these efforts are seldom fully
successful, decisions have to be made on the basis of incomplete
information. Decentralization of decision-making responsibilities
has the further advantage of providing training, experience, and
a testing ground for Junior officers. The best way to develop
and to identify qualities of responsibility, ingenuity, Judgment
and other leadership characteristics is to provide genuine
opportunities for their exercise. As fr. Hitch has written:
The potential advantages of decentralisation are so
great that it would be worth a great expenditure of
thought and administrative ingenuity to find partial
solutions to the problem. The solution does not have
to be perfect. Just better than the centralized solution,
which is very imperfect Indeed. We can live with some
conflict between lower level and higher level criteria,
as General Motors and United States Steel have deliberately
decided to do. If U. S. industrial corporations, with a
market test available, consider themselves too large for
centralized decisions, there is at least some presumption
that the Defense Department and the three Services are
much too large to be making detailed operational decisions.
Hitch, locjcit
. , p» 237»
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On the other hand, even though decentralisation miftfit
take place, the parent organization must maintain responsibility
for the field operation. There thus seems to be an inevitable
tendency in the Defense Department for decisions to be made at
higher and higher levels. There is Justification for this trend.
The high level official can take a broader, less parochial
view; he has a better concept of overall service or national
requirements. It is obvious that the field commander needs
counsel on problems he cannot resolve. Headqunrters has experts
in functional areas with specialized knewledre much better than
most of the field units might have.
If large numbers of detailed decisions ore attempted at
a hi^h level, that level will become borir.ed down by detail and
the result well be delayed decisions end a lack of time
devoted to the essential hijrh level function of policy-making.
Nevertheless, the himh. level official is acutely conscious of
belnp: in a position of authority and will, too frequently, make
the decisions himself. The result is a constant tendency for
the center of rr^vity of decision-making to shift to M^her
echelons. New himher echelons seem, in fact, to pet invented
from time to time in order to facilitate this movement.
operational responsibility must be vested in the
individual. Top military leadership must recormize that over-
supervision will disappear only when operational decisions are
made by commanders closest to the scene of action. This means
reducing staffs in size and improving the quality for fulfilling
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roles of advice and counsel to the commander, not as presently
the role of review and approval of operational decisions. As
Lieut. General H. M. Estes, then Deputy Commander, Aerospace
Systems Office, Air Force Systems Command said:
Too many operational decisions are made by committees
these days. Xn order to get things done, you've first
got to put the maximum responsibility where the maximum
number of facts nre. You've got to delegate as much
authority to as low a level as possible* At the same
time, you must provide a streamlined procedure for
going right to the top for rapid, positive and final
decisions,*
On the other hand, policy formulation and peak coordina-
tion are ideally suited to the group. Secretary Forrestal in
stressing the dangers involved in concentrating too much
authority remarked that he mistrusted the principle of relying
on a single genius to make all basic decisions. He continued!
"Decisions which determine the success or failure of the strate-
gic direction of global war have to be determined by the meeting
of a number of minds, each of which contribut s own
specialised knowledge, while also serving as a balance and check
on the othern.
litary considerations are not necessarily paramount
waino W. Suojanen, "Is Military Organization Really
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3Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal (Hew York: The
Kacmillan Company, 1963), p. 22%
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In the formulation of policy* One must first ask: What is
the primary objective? What overall policy is to be supported?
The long-range objective—not just the immediate aim
of military victory or military security—must be kept in mind.
As Bismarck stated the role of politics and war:
The object of war is to conquer peace under conditions
which are conformable to the policy pursued by the state.
To fix and limit the objectives to be attained by the war
is and remains during the war just as before it a political
function* The manner In which these questions are solved
cannot be without influence on the method of conducting
the war*
Today engaged in a struggle for the world, it is vital
that our planners identify* understand* and properly employ all
kinds of power* Military factors in the formulation of policy
2
have no meaning in a vacuum* National security policy must
comprise a broad spectrum of political, economic* scientific 9
social psychological , and other factors* As Senator Henry M*
Jackson stated at the National War College in 1959
I
The Presidency may and should make the most basic
strategic decisions and in doing so he no doubt needs
the advice and counsel of an agency like the National
Security Council* But neither the President nor the
National Security Council and its Planning Board can make
the detailed plans necessary to give effect to the basic
strategic decisions* Planning of this sort requires the
knowledge and experience of the experts* and also the
resources and the environments of the departments having
the main responsibilities for the operations being planned*
Louis J. Halle. Choice for Survival (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1958). p. 1*7.
2
Hanson W. Baldwin. "The Critical Tomorrows, * U* S* Naval
Institute Proceedings * December 1962, p* 23.
^Hammond, loc* clt *. p. 370*
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Such a national security policy must include that of
allied nations , in whose territories a force wight operate.
Whereas no sound foreign policy can be devised by the West
unless it recognizes the monumental impact of ideology upon
world politics in general, the Communist doctrine is comparative-
ly simple. As Dr. Kurt London has stated) 1 "It has always been
a primary maxim of Communist tactical doctrine that all means
are permissible to achieve a strategic objective, except where
too much risk is involved."
Communist party leader Mao Tse-tung has expressed the
2
strategy of maximum ambiguity in sixteen words; "Enemy advances,
we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack;
enemy retreats, we pursue."
Our strategic problem is even more complicated by the
fact that surprise attack has been explicitly rejected as an
instrument of our policy. Our national military problem has
always been a second-strike policy that would never plan for a
premeditated, unprovoked surprise attack. This is eminently
consistent with our national values and has been closely adhered
to over the years.
1
Kurt London, "Balance Sheet of the Permanent Crisis,"
Air Force Mag;aslne B January 1963, p. 33*
2
Kissinger, loc. clt .. p. 3*»7«
3Ibid., p. 95.
John F. Loosbrock, "Strategic Retreat from Reality,"
Air Force Mas:aglne. January 19^3 » P» 29.
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The outbreak of war is Increasingly considered the
worst catastrophe* Therefore the adequacy of the military
establishment is its ability to preserve the peace » The
paradox! oal consequence is that the success of military policy
depends essentially on psychological criteria. Deterrence seeks
to prevent a given course by making it seem less attractive
than all possible alternatives* It therefore ultimately depends
on an intangible quality: the state of mind of the potential
aggressor* From the point of view of deterrence a seeming
weakness will have the same consequences as an actual one* A
gesture Intended as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful
as a deterrent than a bona fide threat Interpreted as bluff*
Deterrence is a combination of power, the will to use it, and
the assessment of these by the potential foe* Strength, no
matter how overwhelming, is useless without the willingness to
resort to it* Power combined with willingness will be in-
effective if the aggressor does not believe in it or if the
risks of war do not appear sufficiently unattractive to him. 1
Deterrence is, then, the attempt to keep an opponent from
adopting a certain course of action by posing risks which will
seem to him out of proportion to any gains to be achieved* The
strategic requirement of deterrence has led to three conditions
according to Kissinger!
Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New




1« The precondition of deterrence is an invulnerable
retaliatory force capable of immediate action through the
proper commands* An invulnerable retaliatory force
reduces the risk of accidental war* If it is able to
ride out an attack , its dependence on warning will be
greatly diminished* The possibility of error is thereby
greatly lessened*
2. If the goal is stability* invulnerability should
be sought through measures which oonvey a defensive
intent* Whenever a choice exists* invulnerability should
be sought by such measures as dispersal* hardening* and
above all* mobility* These steps increase the ability
to strike back* They do not Improve the ability to strike
first* They thus Improve the defensive* not the offensive,
capacity* Perhaps the single most fruitful approach to
invulnerability lies in creating a mobile deterrent system.
The function of a mobile system would be to produce the
maximum degree of uncertainty in the mind of a potential
aggressor about the chances of a successful attack* To the
degree that the retaliatory force cannot be located it
cannot be destroyed* To the extent* that a potential
aggressor cannot calculate with high probability that
our counterblow will be reduced to safe limits* he will
be deterred*
3* To maintain deterrence two dangers must be avoided*
One is to consider any given strategic relationship as
static* The other is to subordinate present readiness
to long-term balance in procurement*
Beyond generalised alternatives* the nature of a future
enemy attack is difficult to anticipate during the contemporary
cold war conflict* The range of possible actions reaches from
incitement and encouragement of insurrections, through open
intervention in civil wars, through overt aggression on a limited
scale, through nuclear conflict restricted in area and magnitude,
to general thermonuclear war* The key to a successful policy of
limited war is to keep the challenge to the opponent, whether
diplomatic or military, below the threshold which would unleash
an all-out war* Genuine security demands that our military forces
be prepared to meet an attack in any of these major forms with
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flexible forces oapable of a broad range of actions • This
has meant , since 196l a change in policy from sole reliance
on the basic nuclear deterrent forces to building effective
conventional forces • A massive program has been conducted to
modernise air lift and to give ground forces the full flexibility
and mobility needed to deal with those aggressive threats short
of full-scale nuclear war,
Since about 1958, there has been significant national
emphasis in accordance with the reflex strike deterrent policy
to improve military command and control systems. The introduc-
tion of a flexible response strategy has necessitated broadening
the capabilities of the command and control systems in order to
handle the wide range of conflict contingencies, a counterforoe
response capability for absorbing an initial strategic attack,
and delivery of selective and decisive counterblows. A care-
fully scheduled attack needs little weapons automation, but
rapid counterattack needs virtually complete weapons automation*
We are committed to firing the second shot so need superior
defense performance* This, in turn, has meant a change to the
command and control environment*
Flexible response objectives are diverse and complex;
the employment of forces must be regulated by political and
military policies designed to prevent escalation into a large-
scale conflict* Appropriate command and control doctrine must
1
Kintner, loo, cit .* p. 17.
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be available to provide command continuity; such as, from the
National Military Command Center in Washington to the U. S.
Strike Command in Florida for coordination with the Commander-in-
Chief , Europe in Paris concerning, say, an incident occurring
in the Congo* Rapid and secure two-way communications to and
from the theater concerned must be provided.
To assure flexible response, a command and control
capability must exist for substantial contingency planning;
for rapid organisation and world-wide deployment of mobile,
highly adaptable, mixed forces and their support; and for the
command of forces in the battle area. To be flexible Implies
the ability to select responses and courses of action based on
the dynamic situation. Regardless of the amount of preplanning:,
many contingencies will arise both for limited and general war
situations that cannot be previously considered. It is, there-
fore, imperative that the command and control systems used by
commands at all levels give them the ability to assess a
situation quickly and select a course of action which might
not have been planned previously. In an all-out war the targets
are known in advance. Everything depends, therefore, on the
efficiency with which the plan can be Implemented. In a limited
war neither the locale of the conflict nor the targets can be
determined in advance. Everything here depends on the rapidity
with which planning can be adjusted to a developing situation.
Terhune, loc. clt.» p. 13.
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As a result of the flexible response policy, the trend
towards centralization of military command, communications and
supply support is accompanied by a trend towards functional
centralisation, such as Strike Command, to facilitate the rapid
organisation and deployment of a total force anywhere in the
world. This has resulted in specie! requirements for communica-
tions—propagation in hostile environments; security and
survivability; command and control for theaters, missile sites,
deployed units of Strike Command* Large bandwidth communica-
tions and improved multiplexing equipment are required to meet
the increasing emphasis on integration and centralization of
command*
Today's new concept of command and control is only new
in that it eliminates geography from the problem. Communica-
tions have developed to the point where control is possible
from any location and is not limited to near proximity to the
fighting force* Commands can no longer be formulated slowly
and detachedly; controls can no longer be delegated to lower
echelons and forgotten. Command and control become the personal
responsibility of the top national authority in the Intermesh
of military-political-economic-soeiological factors involved
In decision-making in time of cold, limited, or general war*
With modern technology* there are no longer any Isolated areas*
Any diplomatic or military move immediately involves world-wide
consequences* Individual local actions can become of such
international concern and have such far-reaching ramifications
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that military strategy and tactics can no longer be considered
merely by delineating certain geographical areas* It is not
a question of weapons responsiveness* Aircraft missiles and
electronic surveillance systems have given the local commander
an immediate local response capability. A modern military
machine cannot afford local, independent response by a commander.
Even though successful, a local action could be disastrous to
the overall strategy.
The commander in a centralised control system must be
able to see the whole picture, watch the trends, and direct
actions to further the nation 1 s long-range goals. A considerable
number of attack options must be provided to meet a large number
of probable military situations. Since the ultimate objective
^s to limit escalation, such options should provide for restrain-
ing and coerelve responses, such as blockades and shows-of-
feree, short of all-out war. The Cuban missile threat in 1962
emphasised the urgency of centralized command and control.
Control depends on a dynamio real-time flow of data. As reac-
tion times approach zero, our traditional methods of gathering
and digesting data become more and more Inadequate. Decisions
must be based on real-time information. A major problem Is to
collect and to retrieve relevant Information. A large-scale
storage and data processing capability with flexible retrieval
is required. Automatic data processing is the only means which
has the potential for command and control on a global^ real-
time basis. It is a potential which is adaptable to regional,
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national, and even world-governwent aspects of command and
Control, High speed automatic data processing will give the
commander decision-making information, but he is still faced
with the responsibility to make the decision* Automatic data
processing is an additional tool to assist the commander and
his staff. The information technology is important in that it
will affect decision-making in an organization by;
1. Quantifying decisional information,
2. Greatly broadening the scope of each decision
and giving it new visibility.
3. Shortening the planning period.
*• Reducing the incidence of poor decisions caused
by internal time lags in information flow.
5. Heightening the sense of common goals among
managers through their sharing information.
6. De-persona11 zing decisions.
A real problem Insofar as integrating information
systems is that of defining the types of information needed.
As Jack Wright of the Data Processing Division, Navy Management
p
Office wrote s*
Only the manager can specify the real management
information system needs. Only he comprehends the full
magnitude of his own responsibilities for action. Only
he knows the extent of his prior relevant information.
And only he knows the personally-asplred-to, reasonable
1
0. P. Shultz and T. L. Whisler, Management Organization
and the Computer (Qlencoe, 111. : Free Press, I960 ), p. 9.
*vaok Wright, "Integrated Information Systems and
Management ," The Armed Forces Comptroller . September 1963.
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expectations of the overall enterprise In his custody.
All these factors serve to emphasize the vital importance
of placing the direction and control for planning and
guiding the evolution of integrated management informa-
tion systems at the very highest organizational level.
Technological progress causes the number of unmeasurable
and uncontrollable variables to decline, leading to an increasing
rationalisation and, hence, accuracy of decision-making processes,
The number of imponderables facing top management becomes fewer.
Therefore the consequences of selecting from among several
alternative decisions can be better predicted. Automation will
permit Joint decisions by committees to be more easily made.
This is of most importance when one considers the number of
decisions Jointly formulated in the Defense Department and
Washington area.
Secretary McMamara is not too prone to rely on committee
decisions. In his first year as Secretary, he eliminated M21
Defense Department committees and scheduled 129 more for
deactivation. He has expressed his philosophy on committees as:
A consensus of opinion is usually no opinion at all.
Committees are of value only for the purpose of exchanging
ideas • • • the individual in the position of responsi-
bility must make the decision and take the responsibility
for it.
Another evil, besides committee coordination, which can
slow down decision-making is the complexity of the organization,
2 M
As Secretary McNamara has stated: "Size can be managed if
simplified • • • complexity is the biggest threat to an effective
and efficient organization, tt
Buckingham, loc. clt .. p, 47.




Ernest Dale has listed basic characteristics of an
organization to be:
1. Organisation is a planning process. It is
concerned with setting up, developing and maintaining
a structure or pattern of working relationships of the
people within an enterprise. It is carried on con-
tinuously as changes in events, personalities and
environment require.
2. Organization is the determination and assignment
of duties to people so as to obtain the advantages of
fixing responsibility and specialization through sub-
division of work.
3. Organisation Is a plan for integrating or
coordinating most effectively the activities of each
part of the enterprise so that the proper relationships
are established and maintained among the different work
units and so that the total effort of all people in the
enterprise will help accomplish its objectives.
1, Organisation is a means to an end. Good organisa-
tion should be one of the tools of accomplishing the
company 1 s objectives, but it should not become an
objective in itself.
To manage an organisation is to balance a variety of
needs and goals. A professional manager should, therefore, rely
in practice on exercising the three R , s: more rational, more
p
responsible, and more religious management.
Ernest Dale, Planning and Developing the Company
Organization Structure (Hew York; American Management Assocl a-
tion, 1952), p. 11.
2Stanley F. Teele, "The Businessman of the Future, n
Management's Mission In a Hew Society , edited by Dan H. Fenn, Jr.
,




Organisational structures should also be geared to
promote the education and instruction of top-level men who will
primarily devote their time to creative thinking, men who have
had the technical training to understand the implications of
their decisions. As a scientist moves up the ladder and becomes
more of a specialist, his field of interest usually narrows.
As a successful manager moves up the ladder, however, his inter-
ests must broaden. As Peter Drucker has stated: 1
We need a general education that is practical and
makes a man effective, and a specialized education
that is general and makes a man capable of growth,
development and responsibility. The educated person
today naods to be generally educated; he must also be
a high-grade specialist and he needs a general education
the most in the area of his specialty. He needs a
systematic disciplining in the humanities and a humanistic
approach to the sciences. He needs a very high ability
to apply his knowledge, which only performing—that is,
"doing*1—can give.
The newer system of management seeks better performance
through better communications, better decision-making, and
greater coordination of effort rather than by driving men
harder.
Increases in the size of an organization may overload
the system and reduce the speed and quality of decision-making.
The use of staffs to deal with the communications load and still
retain control at the top has been carried to extremes in some
large organizations. Managers should avoid overburdening
themselves with the routine problems or an excess of detailed
1
Peter Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow (New York:
Harpers, 1959), p. 123.
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data and should de legate and rely wore on subordinates • As
former President Kennedy said!
I believe every head of a department is overburdened.
Instead of really getting the best minds in the country
to study the really important problems, you are getting
a staff operation. This gives the President a pre-
compromised final solution without revealing to him
the alternatives that might have been open. Under this
system the President gives an endorsement rather than
a Judgment.
It is organizationally self-defeating but the greatest
ingenuity is expended often towards Justifying the invention of
various Job titles and the drawing of visually logical-appearing
relationships on organization tables. Such interposed staffs
tend to further complicate operational communication lines and
result in creating as many new problems as those they presume
to solve. 2
New technology is stifled unless the organizational
structure can overcome inflexibility, permit improved communica-
tions, and facilitate more efficient and economical operation.
As the installation of automatic data processing equipment is
accomplished, automation will introduce changes in the tradi-
tional concepts of management. The introduction of data
processing systems in many large companies has resulted in broad
changes in organizational structures. Activities formerly
divided among several departments and several managers, sometimes,
have been combined into a single department under a single
^Kennedy, loc. clt .. p. 209.
2Alex Bavelas, "Communication and Organization," Shultz
and Whisler, op» cit .» p. 126.
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manager. The systems concept of operation has come into
prominence, and managers are becoraing more aware of how their
responsibilities interact with those of other managers in
shaping the behavior of the total organization. The basic
systems concept is by nature extremely broad and operationally
will cut across existing organizational lines in gathering data
and disseminating information. The so-called "line and staff*
concept may vanish or at least need reexamination. 3hort
circuiting of the chain of command may be necessary in order
to contact immediately the proper man for the decision.
The organization of the Defense Department must be
such as to enable it to take immediate and responsible action
in the event that the use of armed force is necessary. The
nature of potential armed conflicts requires that our military
power be capable of instantaneous reaction. This necessitates
effective channels of command and communications between military
commanders and their civilian superiors, and procedures enabling
speedy decisions by these responsible civil officials.
Professor Suojanen in 1958 wrote »'
Undoubtedly, the greatest damage to command authority
is done through the fantastic latticework of technical
channels that rise in the Pentagon and are loaded with
specific instructions, directives and requirements for
The Technology Review . May 1963* P. 18.
2
The Military Engineer




all down to the lowest elements of military
establishments. One wonders who really commands
this installation.
Much of this criticism may still be true. There should
now, six years later, be no question as to who "commands the
installation". Some of the efforts to simplify the world's
largest organization initiated under the Secretary of Defense
since 1961 include: the elimination of two Assistant Secretaries
of Defense, the formation of the Defenoe Supply, Intelligence,
Atomic Support, and Communications Agencies; the institution
of program budgets and the Five Year Force Structure and Finan-
cial Plan; realignment of the functions and structures of many
Departmental and Services' offices, such as the Navy reorganisa-
tion; the establishment of the Strike Command as a unified
command and the incorporation therein of the Array's strategic
combat troops and the Air Force's combat tactical fighter
aircraft; the disestablishment of the Eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean Command as a unified command and the transfer of
its functions and taslcs to the new Strike Command; reorganiza-
tion of Army and Air Force missile site activation units; the
transfer of operational control for all major missile firing
and tracking ranges to the Air Force; giving the Air Force the
primary responsibility for the military space mission; the
closing of marginal bases. 1
The Department of Defense is presently organised as
1
Armed Forces Management . November 1961, p. 23.
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shown in Illustration I. The organization includes the Secretary
of Defense as its head f the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Defense staff offices, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint
Staff, the three military departments and the military services
within those departments, the unified and specified commands,
and other Department of Defense agencies as the Secretary of
Defense establishes to meet specific requirements.
In providing Immediate staff assistance and advice to
the Secretary of Defense, the Defense staff offices and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, although separately organized, function
in full coordination and cooperation. The heads of the Defense
staff offices perform such functions as are assigned by the
Secretary of Defense in accordance with existing laws. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a group, are directly responsible to
the Secretary of Defense for the functions assigned to them.
Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other than the Chair-
man, is responsible for keeping the Secretary of his military
department fully informed on matters considered or acted upon
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Secretary of each military department is responsible
to the Secretary of Defense for the operation of such department
as well as its efficiency. Orders to the military departments
arc issued through the Secretaries of these departments, or
their designees, by the Secretary of Defense or under authority
specifically delegated in writing by the Secretary of Defense
as provided by law.
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Commanders of unified and specified commands are
responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for
the accomplishment of military missions assigned to them. The
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders
of unified and specified commands. Orders to such commanders
are issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense, or by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the
Secretary of Defense* These commanders have full operational
control over the forces assigned to them and perform such
missions as are assigned by the Secretary of Defense, with the
approval of the President.
All functions in the Department of Defense and its
component agencies are performed under the direction, authority
and control of the Secretary of Defense. As prescribed by
higher authority, the Department of Defense maintains and
employs armed forces:
1. To support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
2. To insure, by timely and effective military action,
the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas
vital to its interests.
3. To uphold and advance the national policies and
interest of the United States.




During an actual emergency, the Defense organization must
facilitate the rapid flow of military commands to the armed
forces and the presentation of the latest intelligence from the
field to the top command echelons. The world-wide military
command and control system designed to &ive the President all
strategic and tactical information possible in a rapid and
simplified manner and then to permit him to order actions with
a minimum of delay is the subject of the next chapter.
Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 of 31 December




NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM
The vast command and control network designed to enable
a National Command Authority to direct U. S. armed forces
everywhere, anytime, and under all conditions Is called the
"National unitary Command System",
^is concept of a very modern system connecting the
President, his unified and snecified military commanders, and
other governmental executives on a world-wide conferencing
network was just not possible a few years ago. It was not until
June 1962 that the Defense Department began really moving
towards building a completely-integrated command system at the
highest level that would be survivable and would assure con-
tinuity of military operations at all times. Command and control
systems are centralized in the combat operations centers of the
major operational commands and in the control centers of the
regional and overseas commands. The National Military Command
Center is the primary command and control facility through
which the National authorities direct the armed forces as well
as other governmental agencies and is one element of the
National Military Command System, Elements comprising this
System arej
Armed Forces Management




1. National Military Command Center at the Pentagon.
2. Alternate national Military Command Center,
located at a hardened underground aite in the eastern
United States,
3. national Emergency Airborne Command Posts,
modified KC-135 tankers,
4. National Emergency Command Post, Afloat.
The National Military Command System is directed by Air
Force Brigadier General Paul W. Tibbets. There are some one
hundred Joint Staff personnel attached to the National Military
Command Center. The day-to-day, 24-hour work in the Center is
carried out by five watch teams as organisationally shown by
Illustration II. Each team is organized Into emergency action,
situation, and reconnaissance units. These teams not only
constantly monitor the world situation but also are trained to
handle emergency situations.
The main room In the National Military Command Center
is a conference briefing room. A large table in the center of
the room is equipped with individual communications positions
for each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus enabling
world-wide conferencing almost instantly. One wall is covered
by a screen for rear view projection of maps, status reports
and graphs, and two walls have sliding panels with maps indicat-
ing the disposition of our own and enemy forces.
The current actions center is where staff officers
maintain current accounting of world operations, intelligence,
communications and logistics. The walls are covered with maps,
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charts, and other data.
Adjacent to the conference room Is the communi cations
center which maintains contact with all major military commands
world-wide by all available signal means. It is from here that
alerts emanate over the Joint Chief Alerting Network.
"Military vigilance" is an informal term requiring that
top commanders or deputies of specified and unified commands
and their staffs be available in their headquarters. The Secre«
tary of Defense ordered a state of military vigilance amonp;
U. S, world-wide forces within an hour after the assassination
of President Kennedy.
Normal alert places 50% of Strategic Air Command
bombers on ground alert, along with a full alert of Polaris
missile submarines and Air Force ballistic missiles.
A yellow alert would place most forces on standby,
ready for deployment and action. Top readiness condition is
red alert, in which combat forces are ready for defense or
p
strikes.
The Mational Military Command Center also receives
data from the Ballistic Missiles F.arly Warning System, which
provides a minimum of fifteen minutes warning of a macs missile
attack launched over northern polar routes against the United
States and southern Canada and warning of an intermediate range
missile attack against the United Kingdom. The radars can see
»—i
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objects the sise of a house door at a distance of 3000 miles.
The Center is alerted in the event of nuclear attacks on United
States major targets through the Bomb Alarm System. A display
provides any data obtained from the Distant Early Warning Line,
which extends across the Arctic circle in a network of heavy
radar stations supported by an elaborate commtni cations system
which can detect a Soviet attack soon after it leaves Siberian
bases*
In addition to the National Military Command Center in
time of normal routine operations as well as in time of crisis*
the National Hilitary Command System relies heavily on other
command centers, such as? the Army War Room, the Wavy Flag
Plot, the Marine Corps Emergency Action Center, the Air Force
Command Post, the White House Situation Room, the State Depart-
ment Operations Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
North American Air Defense Command Combat Operations Center, the
Strategic Air Command, the Royal Canadian Air Force in Ottawa,
the United Kingdom Government in London.
^
Another important function in which the National Military
Command Center is directly involved has to do with the prevention
of nuclear war breaking out as a result of accident. As
1
Data, March 1963, p. 30.
2
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy * p. 106.
3
^ed Force, Mana.en.nt. Ju ly l96 3 . P. 25.

Professor Hook has stated:
9<*
1
It must be our position to see that accidents
are prevented as far as possible , but that if they
do occur they do not yield or lead to automatic
Inexorable consequences. We must de-couple accidents
and alleged automatic consequences.
The first tangible agreement to emerge from East-West disarmament
talks since World War II was the accord to set up a Washington-
Moscow Hhot line" communications link. The need for this message
channel between Moscow and Washington was underlined during the
Cuban crisis in October 1962 when Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev
had to communicate at times through press e,nd radio statements.
Rather than direct conversation the world leaders have available
a communication system for sending teletype messages across
10,000 miles of undersea and land cables and microwave relay
stations. In the event something goes wrong with the teletype
system, an emergency radio link will be available. When a message
is ready to be sent either from Washington or Moscow, it is
automatically coded as a security measure. The coding prevents
any disclosure of the contents as it is dispatched via London,
Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki. Dally test messages are to
be sent to make sure the circuit is in working order. The
Moscow terminal was to be in the Kremlin and the Washington
terminal in the National Command Center.
1
Sidney Hook, The Fall-Safe Fallacy (New York: Stein
and Day, 19^3)
•
^The Washington Post . 22 June 1963, p. A5.
•*The Washington Post
.
21 June 1963, p. Al.
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In i960, Mr. Kissinger wrote:
In the contemporary turmoil, many situations are
conceivable which could flare up into hostilities not
sought by any of the major powers and yet threateni .
to embroil them--as, for example, the revolt in Iraq.
It becomes .important to provide safeguards to prevent
a spread of local incidents into a general conflagration.
All-out war must not occur simply because the nuclear
powers have not considered how to back away from the
precipice.
This suggests that the West and the Communist countries
may have a common interest in setting up a control system
which will enable them to exchange and verify information,
particularly in times of crisis. A minimum requirement
is for a Joint Soviet-Western technical study to examine
the types of accident and miscalculation that can now be
imagined—and, if they should occur nevertheless, to
keep them from spreading Into a cataclysm.
A scheme which merits attention is the establishment
of a communication system to ©nable the leaders of both
groups to communicate instantaneously. In addition,
special surveillance teams could be set up and trained
to move quickly to trouble spots to verify information
which one side wishes to convey rapidly to its opponents.
The notion of establishing a control system especially
designed for critical periods admittedly sounds strange.
But its strangeness is due to the fact that we still have
not yet comprehended the revolutionary nature of our
present world.
In March 196 1*, Britain presented the first detailed plan
for a system of military observer posts throughout North America,
Europe and Soviet Asia to guard against surprise attack and
accidental war. It provides for observer stations that would
report any activity likely to precede aggression by any member
country of the North American Alliance or the Communist Warsaw
Pact. The posts, equal in number on each side, would be staffed
by nationals from the other side who would be in constant
communications with their respective headquarters. This system
*Henry A. Kissinger, Necessity for Choice , p. 229.

could not prevent deliberate attack, but It would provide
sufficient warning to an intended victim. It would also permit
last-minute political intervention by the major powers "to avert
the outbreak of a war that neither aide desired," according to
Britain's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. 1
With a maximum warning available of less than 15 minutes,
there is hardly time for sober calculation in the missile age.
Information must be obtained, transmitted, evaluated and acted
upon* The penalty of acting on incorrect information is enormous.
Airplanes can be launched as a defensive measure but can be
recalled if the information is faulty. The decision to launch
a missile is, however, irrevocable. The danger of accident is
therefore high. As the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air
2Command General Power stated:
The radars have picked up 1000 objects. The computer
says they are ballistic missiles, and they will impact
in the United States. I have about 12 minutes left
because it took three minutes so far. What am I going
to do? I can launch the alert force • • • I will do
that without any hesitancy because I know that, if this
turns out to be a spurious signal, no harm Is done ...
but in this time period we will also have a button whereby
I can send the missiles on their way. Do I want to do
It, assuming I had authority to do so? Because sure as
shooting, in another two or three minutes, a lad will say,
"I am sorry, but those blips have disappeared off the
scope." They were sputniks, interference, or something
like that. Therefore, I say the missile will have to
ride out the attack.
1
The Washington Post . 27 March 196*1, p. All.
2
U. S, House of Represent stives, Subcommittee on




Insofar as modern data processing equipment is concerned,
the National Military Command System is in the developmental
stage. The System is essentially an information and communica-
tions system. Therefore the major advances forthcoming should
be in the fields of data processing, display and communications.
Perhaps the most important factor in the automatic data process-
ing and information management will be the data communications
network. Tremendous gains in efficiency and economy can be
realized by automatically feeding data from remote points to a
central processing center, such as the National Military Command
Center. Computers on opposite ends of the nation can exchange
data in seconds. Advances in Information retrieval will allow
various world-wide commands to have direct communications to the
central file of current information in a master computer. This
will immensely improve the efficiency of operations by reducing
confusion, speeding the flow of accurate information, and
reducing the need for cumbersome control mechanisms •
'
Representative Pucinskl has Introduced a bill in Congress
to establish a national research data processing and information
retrieval center. The idea is to assemble and file on perforated
tape for handy reference an index to all the world's scientific
information. This is the nature of information retrieval center
which could be of Immeasurable value in the National Military
Systems Management . July-August, 1962, p. **,
2
The Military Engineer




The Air Force Aerospace Communications Complex includes
the world 1 * largest, most advanced digital data communications
system. This high-speed, fully-automatic end transistorised
communications system, world-wide in scope, will ultimately be
capable of transmitting any form of digital information, includ-
ing voice and graphics. It will also process a large amount of
narrative administrative traffic. Initially the system will
have the capability to transmit about 12 million punched cards
daily and will link over 300 commands, bases, depots, and
agencies. 1
A device recently developed by the Teleregister
Corporation is capable of giving answers almost as fast as you
can ask the questions. An electric typewriter communicates
almost instantly with high-speed computer systems. The informa-
tion being sent or the question beinjr asked can be seen on a
television screen as fast as it is typed. The information is
stored immediately in the computer, or, if a question is being
asked, the answer can be Riven in less than a second. Savings
in manpower and effort will be tremendous with the use of this
2information feeding and retrieval system.
Another technological breakthrough has recently been
achieved by the International Business Machines Corporation which
1
AFDATACOH, a pamphlet published by the Western Union
Telep;ranh Company, 1^62.
2
The Washington poat . 11 February 196^, p. B2.
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has Invented a new system which provides Information from a
computer In the form of spoken words. The new 7770 audio
response unit melees the millions of facts within a computer
available over the telephone.
Other command and computer research is being conducted
in such areas as:
1. Man-machine interface; the techniques, displays and
controls required to let men see and understand what is going
on inside a computer and to make the computer responsive to their
questions.
2. Languages and translators to bridge the gap between
the way men think and the technical detail involved in the
internal workings of the machines.
3. Techniques that will allow many mn the simultaneous
use of the same computer.
4. Computer communications problems that arise when
several machines are connected together in a network.
Considerable progress is being made in computer program
production. There is a better understanding of the management
and development aspects, continued development and increasing
acceptance of procedure-oriented languages, improved scanners
and study of the most efficient use of computers for program
production and checkout.
Progress is also beinp; accomplished in the field of
communications. Demands for flexible and secure command circuits
*The Washlnrton Post
. 7 February 196*, p. B7.
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have Increased with United States responsibilities abroad and
the number of potential trouble spots around the world, Military
satellites should soon introduce new flexibility in defense
conmuni cations. One group of spheres will belong to the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation which on 22 December 1963
called on American industry to design a simple but reliable
system of earth-circling satellites to beam television and
messages over nearly all the world. The other satellite family
would belong to the Defense Department to link strategic military
forces of the United States around the world for cold-war or
hot-war communications. The Pentagon has plans for as many as
thirty satellites orbiting at altitudes of 6000 to 10,000
miles. The first flock of six or seven satellites would be
launched by rocket in 19&5 with the full system in operation -
year later, Not long ago an antenna developed for the U, S,
Army Satellite Communications Agency contacted a satellite at
an altitude of 22,300 miles and provided a communications link
between California and the West Coast of Africa, a distance of
7700 miles, * Communications satellites receive signals from
ground transmitters on one side of the world, amplify them and
beam them to distant ground stations. Industry is developing
portable ground stations that can be flown to new command posts,
helping the military to bypass conventional and more vulnerable
communications methods.




There is a tremendous need for automation of eomnand
activities at the national level. Pre is bein? made.
In a memorandum to the Heads of all Executive Departments and
Agencies dated 21 August 19^3, the President directed that a
National Communications System be established and developed by
linking together, Improving, <md extending, on an evolutionary
basis, the communications facilities and components of the
various Federal agencies. The objective of the National Com-
munications System is to provide necessary communications for
the Federal Government under all conditions ranging from a
normal situation to national emergencies and international
crises including nuclear attack. The President further directed
that the Secretary of Defense serve as Executive Agent for the
National Communications System. The Manager, National Communica-
tions System, who shall be the Director, Defense Communications
Agency, performs the principal unified technical planning for
the establishment and development of the National Communications
System and exercises operational direction.
1
Department of Defense Directive 5100 , frl of 5 October
1963. "Arrangements for the Discharge of Executive Arent




The role of the military in formulating national
security policy is broad. In order to formulate sound policy,
one must consider a number of intermeshed factors; such as,
political, economic, social, psychological, Ideological, and
military. The military factor, however, does not necessarily
dominate.
The technical complexity of most disputes complicates
civilian control and particularly Congressional control. A
meaningful judgment by the Congress on the defense budget would
require it to assess the military strength achieved by a given
expenditure and to correlate this strength to an agreed set of
national security objectives. Neither condition Is met by
current practice. To be sure, the budget is Introduced by
testimony of the service chiefs and their civilian superiors
regarding the gravity of the international situation. The
Congressional committees can make their judgments in terms of
their assessments of the international scene and of their
previous experience as members of the committees. They will
hesitate to reduce the budget if they feel the situation to be
grave, and they will be disposed to pare requirements drastically




represented. 1 The armed forces are, however, services* They
serve the Nation* They are an Instrument of national policy*
There is no evidence of usurpation by the military of the
traditional status of civilian control* Congressional control
has weakened because of the complexity of the weapons technology
utilised by the military which defies correlating to a dollar
base without considerable military or scientific background*
Mutual trust and confidence as well as effective coordination
and cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches
seem to be the most practical partial solution* A national
information retrieval center would also prove most useful to
Congress in obtaining the desired data to evaluate Independently
the defense appropriation requests* As to the issue of civilian
control of the military, there is or should be little question*
If anything, civilian control is more predominant than ever*
As stated in an editorial? 3
We have disagreed with many specific proposals
of the McKamara team, but find it most refreshing
(as do many Pentagon people who have lost an argument
or two) that after over a decade of wandering around
trying to figure out who was calling the shots, there
now is absolutely no questions in anybody's mind about
where to go to get a decision in a hurry*
1
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy , p. $15*
2
Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization (New York!
Hibbert Printing Company, 195^), p. iub.
3
Armed Forces Management. November 1961, p* 21*

10*1
The most significant single management weapon the
Defense Secretary has for getting a united team effort towards
the primary objective—the defense of the Nation and the Free
World—is the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan
concept* This is the first link the Defense Department has had
between military planning and defense budgeting. The evolution
of the Comptroller channel as the most effective means for
exercising control has resulted partly from the ineffective
operations of other organisations and procedures within the
Defense Department. The Comptroller's function includes gather-
ing a great deal of diverse information on defense operations
through the process of statistical and program reporting.
Difficulties the politically-appointed officials may have
experienced in obtaining adequate Information from other sources
on which to base their decisions have led them to rely increas-
ingly on the Comptroller. Regardless of the invaluable role of
the Comptroller in coordinating the budget and in improving
economy in operations, his function must continue to be that
of providing advice not decisions. He should be a line manager
and make decisions when necessary within his own staff organisa-
tion. His primary function as Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense is one of providing advice and assistance , as requested.
As an example of what the programmed approach to
budgeting is accomplishing within the Defense Department 9
Joseph Alsop stated:
^The Washington Post. 10 January 196*1, p. All.
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This year's call for $103*8 billion for new ob 11 national
authority was a whacking $4 billion plus below the call made
last year* Secretary McNaraara's Defense Department accounted
for Just about three quarters of this enormous cut in future
spending plans* And this was accomplished although the
$50*8 billion of new spending authority to be requested
for the armed services necessarily includes provision for
heavy Increases in some fixed items* mainly service pay*
amounting to $2 billion in all*
In addition* the crucial task of bringing the entire
nuclear armament of the U* S* under centralised remote
control, which can even be exercised from the air* is
also being carried forward with urgency*
McHamara's achievement—-providing a great deal of
national power at a far lower unit cost—-deserves the
adjective historic simply because it is almost without
parallel*
Dees a proposed change in organisation really streamline
the operation or does it mainly transfer the workload and
problems from one group to someone else? This is a question
that might be asked those who tend to blame the organisation
and demand drastic changes when performance is not what they
consider satisfactory* Quite often the changes won't necessarily
solve the problem* It might instead be a need to assure that
people are required to do their jobs* This* then* means tighter
control or higher performance standards* Admiral Arleigh A*
Burke said? 1
I would favor constructive changes* but* before we
make any changes, let's be sure they will actually Improve
our method of arriving at proper decisions* There are
many things other than organization which contribute to
the success or to the smooth operation of the decision-
making process* The entire process is limited by human
mentality* Ho matter how brilliant* no man is omniscient*
There is no organisation or procedural means for removing
that limitation* I suggest that no form of organisation
can be better than the men who man it*
X
*n»« Fore Manas.*..* . November I960, p. .7.
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The biggest single problem seems to be that managers
devote too much time to current operations and not enough to
planning* So much time is spent on "urgent" things that no
time is left for Important things What is needed In the Defense
Department, as well as most organisations , is better management
through application of sound management principles at all levels*
As Secretary McNamara saids 1 "There is an unexcelled wealth of
capable people in this organisation* They must spend more time
utilising their ability and less time Justifying it."
Often advocates of reorganisation lean heavily on the
contention that too much "bickering" occurs among the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the various services* On the other hand,
honest differences of opinion in Congress are expected and
called legislative debate* In the Supreme Court the term used
might be legal oplnlonating* Discussion, consideration and
argument are desirable and valuable among those who must provide
military advice to the Secretary of Defense on such complex,
highly-important issues as are involved with military policy*
The trend for operational decisions will likely be
towards more central control* The advances made in communica-
tions, among machines as well as people, now allow for direct,
cheap, and immediate flow and feedback of Information at widely-
separated geographic points* Whether or not centralisation is
appropriate will vary with the situation* Management will have
1
Armed Forces Management , November 1961, p* 7*
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a capacity never possible before to centralize or decentralize
its decision-making • Properly the decision should be wade at
the source of the best information. With computer communica-
tions, an information storage and retrieval system, a national
communications system all integrated in the near future for use
at a central location, such as the National Military Command
Center; the advantages seem most favorable for an increase in
centrallaed decision-making* Tactical decisions in many Isolated
areas of the globe will continue to be made locally, aa
circumstances warrant.
Modern management is in an era of accelerated technical
change. Automation, and the concepts that it embodies, has
become a national resource. This scientific revolution creates
problems concerning the processes by which management puts
technology to work and also the way these changes affect the
nature of management and the process of managing as known today.
Information technology allows management to eope with
increasingly complex problems using fewer people and a more
centralised organisation. The computers can produce information
about what is happening now, as well as continuously update
information about what will be the probable consequences of
specific decisions based on present and predicted circumstances.
In many situations, built-in feedback monitors the work and
deals with routine changes with little or no human intervention.
This frees management for attending to more basic, important
duties. Freeing management from petty distractions permits
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more preoise, better substantiated decision-making in military
strategy or taotics. Thus, nananement in government can have
much better control both over the systerc as it operates and
over the introduction of changes into future operations.
The Increased complexity and inter-relationships of
functions within an organization mean effective planning is
mandatory if rapid, successful adjustment to change Is at all
possible. Management must look more precisely towards the
future. One reason for the failure of organ! sations to function
reliably has been hyper-complexity—overgorwth in an effort to
achieve the necessary response. This type of organisation was
adequate for control of more simple operations but is not
effective today or sufficient for the future.
The new organization, National Military Command System
as evolving, is above all an information and decision-making
system. It is not workable to organize machines and men Into
a single, integrated, automatic defense system by applying some
of the time-worn, traditional methods; such as the line-staff
concept. Integrated systems will cut across organizational
lines.
Some major events during the past few years which have
resulted in so much emphasis for a more modern command and
control system have been**
1, Emergence of the intercontinental ballistic
missile. The short reaction time and the terrible
Armed Forces Management , July 1962, p, 20,
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consequences if Information be erroneous concerning
an impending missile attack or if a nuclear accident
occurs has taxed the best technical minds of the
nation in devising a system which would deter attack
and also safeguard against an ill-advised counterattack,
2. The "coming of age" of the electronic computer
which can process needed information in a usable and
secure form for the military commander.
3. Greater unification of the Defense establishment
has nade greater demands for a unified and national
command and control system,
to. The U. S. defense capability must be able to
give the President a choice between alternative courses
of action—not Just surrender or global war.
There is no magic formula that will make human Judgment
unnecessary. Combat experience cannot be built into a machine.
The hardware, in effect, has taken a control system that existed
before and Just speeded up the computation. The human brain
is a far more efficient control apparatus than is the intelligent
machine when delving into higher areas of logic. * As Scott
Crossfield in paying tribute to Major Robert M. White, the
X-15 pilot, said: "Where else would you get a nonline
computer weighing only 160 pounds havinr ft million precision
elements that can be mass produced by unskilled labor?"
Whether the military is destined to a pre-planned push-
button mode of warfare, only time will tell. Success appears to
hin^e upon how wisely automatic data processing is exploited
and to the extent automatic command and control is achieved. The
^Norbert Wiener, "Moral and Technical Consequences of
Automation « Automation: Implications for the/utur«. ^ris
Philipson (ed.), (Hew Vork: Handom House, inc., i9o2), p. 170
2Baldwin, loc. cit .

110
future successful acquisition of command and control systems
will depend In large measure upon the teamwork established
amonp1 those involved In planning, defining, constructing,
buying, imp lenientin g, and operating these systems of tomorrow.
Command and control systems provide the key to effective
decision-Raking, to safe and accurate weapon response to
decisions, to the desired force manipulation.
The integration of a national communications system
with an automated data processing and retrieval system located
in a centralised information center, such as the National
r-ilitary Command Center, will not only be a means of survival
but also will prove to be of immeasurable value for management
control and for providing all levels of management with the
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CAPT R.M. KEITHLY, USN 78863
HAJ C.R. KEMBLE, USA 78863
YN1 E.J. PROULX, USN 78863
MILITARY SECRETARY
ROOM 2D8bb
LCOL W.D. KELLY, USAF 54532
MR J.R. JOHANSON.ST. ASST 54683
MRS E. MORGAN 54532
MRS P. TURNER 54532







SSQT Z. RUIZ, USA
ADMIN BRANCH
ROOM 5Ki72
LCOL V.L. ANTONTOLI, USA 56031
MR W.N. ROBINSON, ADMIN ASST 56031
MRS M. COFFEY 56027
MISS B. BROWN 5602?
MISS A. HEWITT 56031
MRS M.J. RODOERS 56027










53579 YN2 A.D. HORNER, USN
53579 TSQT L.S. MEAD, USAF
53656 TSOT RILEY
53656 ROT MTTJ.KR
53579 YN1 G.A. JENKINS, USN
53579 YN1 W.R. LANGLEY, USN
53579 SSOT R.D. WILLIAMS, USA
53656 SSGT R.L. SOMERVTLLE, USAF
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROOM 2&B78
F. T. UNGER USA 73702
MRS IRIS S. JONES, SECY 73702
VICE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROOM 2DH7B
RADM J, L. CHEW, USN 562*13
MRS NELL BRINDLEY, SECY 56243
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COMMANDS/AREAS
ROOM 2D«7«
BRIO OEN L. D. CLAY, JR., USAF 79031
MRS SHIRLEY DERENDORF, SECY 79031
EUROPEAN/MIDDLE EAST DIVISION (EUME)
CHIEF, COL R, P. SIORDAN, USAF 51846
MRS. RUTH NEFFLEN, SECY 75690
COL G. P. WINTON, USA 71330
CAPT A. L. MALTBY, USN 53640
CAPT R, J. MORGAN, USN 53640
COL 0. H. CRIST, USAF 71 355
COL H. R. JOHNSTON, USAF 72844
COL J. W. ANTONELLI , USMC 71355
ROOM 2B927
COL B, D. WHITE, USA 57909
COL R. R. SCOTT, USAF 57909
COL D. P, BOLTON, USA 57903
LCOL C. D. FERGUSON, USMC 57903
COL R, BESSON, USA 53640
COL J. R. NICKOLS, USAF 72844
LCOL L. B. HARDY, USA 72844
LCOL J. E. DUNN, USA
SMS E. E. NEWTON, USAF 75690
MRS. ELSIE THOMPSON, SECY 71330
MRS. LINDA AKERS, SECY 53640
MISS SHIRLEY GOLOB, SECY 57903
ATLANTIC/SOUTH DIVISION (L/S)
ROOM 2D855A
CHIEF, CAPT D.L. MOODY, USN 53772
MISS BEATRICE PROCOPIO, SECY
ROOM 2D855
53779
CAPT C.R. CLARK, USN 53779
LCOL W.B. FORBES, USAF 53772
MAJ A,B. HARMON, USMC 53779
A VACANCY 53772
MRS. GERALDINE BARFIELD, SECY 53779
ROOM 2D859
COL W. GREENWOOD, JR., USA 53517
COL W.A. CAMPBELL, USA 78757
COL J.B. LATSHAW, JR., USAF 53517
CAPT J.H. TURNER, USN 73860
MRS. CAROLE ~LADD, SECY 53517
ROOM 2C871
COL J.F. WILHM, USA 53084
CAPT H.B. STARK, USN 73477
COL E.G. GAMMON, JR., USAF 53084
MISS ELAINE WEISZ, SECY 73477
NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION {NA)
ROOM 2C925
CHIEF, COL H.T. SMITH, USA 72203
COL J.H. PEASE, USAF 72203
COL W.A. PURDY, USA 59752
CAPT R. OODMAN, USN 72209
COL W.E. MODESITT, USAF 72209
MRS. MARGE MORAN, SECY 72203
MRS. BETTY I. RASMUSSEN, SECY 59752
ROOM 2C931
COL R.L. KOLB, USA 72234
COL S.S. HIRSHBERG, USAF 59827
USA VACANCY
LCOL A.M. WELBES, USAF 59829
MRS. SUSAN CHUMMKTT, SilOJf 59829
PACIFIC DIVISION (PAC)
ROOM 2B924
CHIEF, COL CM. MOUNT, JR, USA 77921
MISS VIRGINIA DUGGAN, SECY 53031
ROOM 2B920
COL W. MOORE, USAF 74873
LCOL F.R. VEACH, JR, USA 74873
CAPT J.S. ELKINS, JR., USN 54807
MRS. JOYCE NICHOLAS, SECY 54807
ROOM 2B932
CAPT W.H. SHEA, USN 54773
COL R.E. HOLSEY, USA 53031
SFC G.A. SIMONDS, JR, USA 53031
ROOM 2B934
COL V.V. LAUOHLIN, USA 78328
COL E.G. GLIDDEN, JR., USMC 77254
LCOL E.J. DALEY, USA 78328
MISS MARIE SARDINHA, SECY 77254
CAPT H.S. JACKSON, USN 77362
CAPT E.M. COMPTON, USN 53049




CHIEF, CAPT F. WAMPLER, JR., USN
ROOM 2B889
MRS SHIRLEY SCHMICK, SECY
MISS JANE ODDENXNO, SECY
ROOM 2B889A
COL G.L. HIGGINS, USA
COL F.W. HASSELBACK, USA
CAPT D. GORDON, USN
COL R.G. OLSON, USAF
COL R.T. BOWIE, USA
CAPT N.S. WEARY, USN
AF VACANCY
ROOM 2C857
COL W.S. CHAIRSELL, USAF
COL D.R. WARD, USA
CAPT L.O. GRANING, USN
COL L.W. PRESTON, USAF
LCOL A.R. TOFFLER, USA
SFC J.E. MARCHLEWSKI, USA
MRS. HELEN TWYMAN, SECY















CHIEF, COL R.D. STEAKLEY, USAF 57356
CAPT R.A. SWEATT, USN 57357
COL F.A. SHIRLEY, USAF 57357
COL G.E. BAUCOM, JR., USAF 57357
LCOL R. GULLIXSON, USA 57357
CDR H.E. FITZWATER, USN 57357
CDR R.F. ROEMER, USN 57357
CDR N.O. SCOTT, JR., USN 57357
LCOL L.S. JOURDAN, JR., USAF 57357
LCOL R.W. WILLIAMS, USA 57357
SMS USAF VACANCY 57357
MSGT F.E. BALLEW, USAF 57357
SFC R.D. MCCOY, USA 57357
YN1 A. MARROCCO, USN 57357
YN1 D. BOYCE, USN 57357
MRS. DONNA MYERS, SECY 57356
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS DIVISION
ROOM 2B914
CHIEF, COL B. C. ANDRUS JR., USAF
COL C. H. STRONG, USA
ROOM 2B916
CAPT C. A. IARROBINO, USN
LCOL T. M. NEAL, USAF
LT R. E. BANMAN, USN
MRS EDITH CONWAY, SECY
MISS MARY E. MYERS, SECY
ROOM 2B913
COL T. F. PERPICH, USA
CAPT W. J. RUEFLE, USN
CDR R. A. DUVALL, USN
LCOL S. A. MARCINKO, USAF
MISS ELLEN DUFFY, SECY
ROOM 2B917
COL J. W. HARRELL, USAF
COL J. H. ELDER, USA
CAPT M. R. ETHERIDGE, USN
COL A. E. AENCHBACHER, USAF
LCOL W. E. NAYLOR, USAF (TDY)
COL C. A. TATE, USAF
CAPT C. B. ANDERSON, USN
MISS GERALDINE HARDIN, SECY
MISS CAROL GREEN, SECY
ROOM 2B917A
LCOL J. G. SHANAHAN, USA
SFC J. N. LILES, USA



















CHIEF, COL D.L. COATES, USA 59104
COL G.B. WEBSTER, JR., USA 59104
COL E.J. SALIBA, USAF 59103
MISS NANCY JORDAN, SECY 59103
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ROOM 2C870
CDR D.A. HEBERLING, USN 50000
MSGT R.J. CARROLL, USAF 59293
YN1 M.M. MERKEL, USN 59293
TSGT B.M. WALLACE, USAF 59293
YNCM J.E. JOHNSTON, USN 59293
OPERATIONS & TRAINING BRANCH (OT)
ROOM 2B885
COL J.E. PIZZI, USA
LCOL G.I. STOECKERT, US
LCOL F.R. PECK, USAF
SMAJ F. WYPA, TTSA
YN1 C.R. HUMPHREY, USN










SYSTEMS & FACILITIES BRANCH (SF
ROOM 2C868
CDR E.L. EUSTIS, JR., USt
LCOL M. E. STANDISH, USA
LCOL A. M. CORDES, USMC
LCOL D. F, BENADOM, USAF
TSGT R. M. SCHWENN, USAF
RMC E. L. McLUCKIE, USN
MSGT J.W. GOODWIN, USA 572?
SP-5 R.M. PUCHALSKI, USA 57291






















COL R.L. STEINBACHER, USA 53^87
CAPT N.R. GIRAULT, USN 53783
LCOL R.D. GLASER, USA 53487
MRS. BARBARA REDENBO, SECY 53783
ROOM 2B881
COL W. C. McGLOTHLIN,JR,USAF 5**07
LCOL I.D. WARDEN, USA
LCOL E. M. POTTER, JR, USAF
LCOL M.D. YANTIS, USA
ROOM 2B877
YNC J. PRICE, JR. , USN






SSGT J. P. HAMPTON, USA
ROOM 2C870
MAI C.S. TOMLIN, USN
MA2 S.B, PLUMB, USN
MA 2 G.D. BEATTY, USN
TSGT W. L. RUSSELL, USAF
NMCC SUPPORT BRANCH (SUP^
ROOM 2C913
CAPT D.E. WILLMAN, USN
LCOL W. H. LANAOAN, USMC
LCOL K.B. BRICE, USAF
SMS A.C. ANDERSON, USAF
MSGT F.C. ADAMS, USAF
YN1 T. W. WEISEN, USN
SD2 V. P. ABELENDE, USN
ROOM 2C873
COL J.M. FAHEY, USAF
CDR T.H. BROWN, USN
ROOM 2C856
LCOL A.F. AHRENHOLZ, USA
LCOL R.B. McBRIDE, III, USA




DMC D.E. SAGAMANG, USN
SP-6 J.C. ROUSSEAU, USA ?""*£ \
SP-6 J.J. BITTNER, USA . Jf, \
ROOM 2D873
MAJ J.R. MARKEY, USAF 78368
TSGT C. E. GILL, JR, USAF 78368
SSGT C. J. NEW, USA
QM1 D.D. EERRYMAN, USN
































COL R.P. FLINN, USAF
LCOL T.C. WHITWORTH, USA
CDR C. BURKHART, USN
LCOL W. A. CARTER, JR, USAF
LCOL R. A. NOVOTNY, USAF
LCOL N.W. POOLEY, USA
LCOL J.B. REES, USA
CDR "W" "J" REDWINE, USN
MAJ L.D. HIOHHOUSE, USMC
YNCA O.K. BLANKENSHIP, USN
SFC H.W. CROSSAN, USA
SSQT H.M, BROOKS, USA
MSGT M.B. HAMILTON, USAF
YN1 R.L. HIBNER, USN
YN2 A.L. OEHMKE, USN
MSGT R.J. PLOURDE, USAF
SSGT L.E. SMITH, USAF
SFC R.L. TUTTLE, USA
MR. J. RATWAY
ROOM 2D877
SMS C. E, BUSCH, USAF
SFC K. H. FENSLAGE, USA












ORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
9 JANUARY 1964
DEPUTY DIRECTOR 'FOR NMCS
ROOM 2DH77
BRIG GEN P. W. TLBBETS, USAF 73229
MRS ANNE LaFOY, SECY 73229
DEPUTY DIRECTORS FOR OPERATIONS fNMCC)
ROOM 2D677
BRIO GEN R. M. CROW, USAF
RADM J. 0. MINER, USN







CHIEF, CAPT G.E. PEDDICORD,USN 78322
LCOL N.W. WALSH, USA
LCOL C. E. LIRETTE, USAF
LCOL J. A. DAVIS, USA.
LCOL J. McCLELLAND, USAF
CMS W. R. BARNETT, USAF
MSGT B. F. PIPER, USAF
YNC D.L. SULLIVAN, USN
QM1 H.T. HOOD, USN
SP-5 O.K. COOPER, USA
SSGT E. GOINS, USA
DM1 R. H. LARKIN, USN
CDR J.H. EUBANKS, USN
LCDR R.B. WARD, USN
SMS G.V. HARRIS, USAF
YN1 L. J. VTALPANDO, USN
MAJ W. P. SENIO, USAF
CTC F.E-. SMITH, USN
SFC E. M. BREWER, USA
CDR J. D. STEPHENS, USN























CHIEF, COL M.G. ZUMWALT, USAF
LCOL F.T. SLATE, USA
LCOL J. F. WILEY, USAF
MAJ G. H. DAY,USA
LCDR R.O. SPENCER, USN
LCOL H.R. ADAMS, USAF
ATC G.J. ANDERSON, USN
GYSGT F.J. MORGAN, JR., USMC
SMS J. E. ATKINS, USAF
YNC R.J. VTEAU, USN
SSGT J. E. COOPER, USA
MSGT H. HELLER, USAF
MSGT R.M. CHAIRIZIA, USAF
CDR P.S. SEAMAN, USN
MAJ C.T.J. HEWGLEY. USA
YNC A.C. BLOCK, USN
SFC R.L. WALSH, USA
LT G.C. MONTGOMERY, USN
CT1 B.W. KAYS, USN
SSGT M.L. GROSSMAN, USA
MAJ W.L. HASTY, USAF




CHIEF, COL C.H. ANDERSON, USA
LCOL E.F. HART, USA
LCOL S.G. MAYNARD, USA
CDR J.H. HENSON, USN
MAJ T.C. OBERST, USA
MAJ R.W. MITCHELL, USA
SMS C.M. MOORE, USAF
QMC J.C. KASOVSKY, USN
SSGT J.J. DOLPHIN, USMC
YN1 J.F. BROWN, USN
SP-5 C.H. WATKINS, USA
A1C R.B. EVANS, USAF
MAJ A.J. TARE, USAF
MAJ E.M. MARKHAM, III, USA
MSGT F.E. JONES, JR., USA
YN2 A. G. FERRER, USN
MAJ J.M. BLUM, USAF
SFC F.F. TAKUSKI, USA
SSGT R.E. LLBBEY, USAF
MAJ W. F. HOMEN, USAF




CHIEF, COL D.S. GLOVER, USAF
LCOL C. L. BROKAW, USAF
MAJ J.R, HENDRIX, USA
LCDR F.J. CLAWSON, USN
MAJ T.B. KUENNING, USAF
LCOL N.E. BROWN, USAF
MSOT J.E. BOITNOTT, USMC
MSGT A. R. LANDRY, USA
YNCS H.N. AUSTIN, USN
SSGT R. J. HESTER, USMC
SP-5 R.A. WALLACE, USA
SP-6 R.R. ROEDEL, USA
LCOL J.J. MEHOLIC, USAF
LCDR H.O. FLOM, USN
RM2 J.D. CHUTCHFIELD, USN
YNC R.G. MCINTOSH, USN
CAPT G.H. NORDIN, USA
CT1 R.E. WALSH, USN
SGT W.A. MEECH, USMC




CHIEF, CAPT S.N. BANEY, USN
LCOL D.A. SEIBERT, USA
LCOL J.E. MARSHALL, USA
MAJ R.E. HUNTER, USMC
CDR C.S. HATTAWAY, USN
GYSGT N.S. THOMAS, USMC
QMC E.R. FONSECA, USN
YNC R.L. YOUNT, USN
SMS R.A. MALTBY, USAF
SP-5 J.E. PRZYWARA, USA
DM3 B.C. THOMPSON, USN
LCOL J.R. WALD1E, USA
MAJ D.A. MICHELit, USAF
YNCS J.R. RICH, USN
SP-7 C.R. EWALT, USA
CAPT J.J. ROGERS, USA
SSGT J.F. BBOSTOSKI, USAF
SSGT L.W. HARRIGER, USAF














































































DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ANMCC
BGEN R.B. SMITH, USA 8l454
ANMCC STAFF ELEMENT
CDR P. BOLAND, USH 8l4l6
MAJ D.B. PLYLER, USA 8l4l6
MSGT G.B. ASHLEY, USA 8l4l6
MSGT B.K.B. LUM, USAF 8l4l6
MSGT C.E. ELMORE, USAF 8l4l6
SFC A.L. HODELL, JR., USA 8l4l6
YNCS R.F. RUSSELL, USN 8l4l6
YN1 H.A. RHODES, USN 8l4l6
CURTIS, USN 81416
SGT D.E. LAKE, USMC 8l4l6
\ MAJ P
ANMCC OPERATIONS TEAM 1







IJMSGT L.H. EISENMAN, USAF
j SFC V.E. ALBONICO, USA
J COL D.B. McFADDEN, JR,







LCOL A.S. ARENDT, USAF
J SSOT F.R. SCHEIE, USAF
| YNCM R.L. TATE, USN
k SSOT V.D. MAYHALL, USAF
j SSOT R.F. BRISSETTE, USA
5 SSOT J.C. BABCOCK, USA
























ANMCC OPERATIONS TEAM 2
I CHIEF, CAPT J.T. BITTING, USN
fcLCOL A.L. MORRISON, USAF
J
CDR C. SHERWOOD, USN
J SFC J.D. WHEDBEE, USA
(SSGT H.H. HIGH, USA
kCOL B.H. aiLMORE, USAF
(LCOL R.C. YOHELL, USA
J LCOL R. REOTSNSNIDER, USAF
(LCDR A.E. RICHARDS, USN
kMAJ E.L. SKELTON, USAF
JLCDR C.A. FAHEY, USN
JSFC H.C. HILL, USA
I MAI J.T. WOOD, USN
1 SSGT P.E. COOK, USMC
j LCOL R.L. SEIDEL, USA
J SP-5 R.V. BALDWIN, USA
J SMAJ 0. BOWLING, USA
^ SOT R.G. BLASER, USA
JTSGT W.C. MUTE, USAF
























I LCOL T.J. GRAGG, USAF
JGYSOT H.R. NORMAN, USMC
2 MSGT C.K. COMER, USAF
J COL E.G. SHELTON, JR, , USA
I LCOL J.E. CARSON, USA
jCDR J.C. HORTON, USN
JLT D.H. WESTBROOK, USN
J MAJ B.E. MILLS, USAF
| MAJ J.T. McLADJ, USAF
kLCOL F.C. HILLER, USA
JYNC G.D. JOHNSTON, USN
J TSGT E. WILSON, USAF
\ TSGT L. WEAVER, JR. , USAF
kMAl G.C. WOLFE, USN
J SSOT J. 0. BILLIU, USAF
S SOT R.D. CAMERON, USA
| SSGT V.J. HANSEN, USA
JMSGT R.T. ANDERSON, USA
5 DM1 F.J. SCOTT, USN
JTSGT W.C. BECKER, USAF
| SSGT B.C. WEBER, USA


























NEACP OPERATIONS TEAM 1
CHIEF, LCOL R.J. BIGART, USA
LCOL W.T. GENTRY, USAF
MAJ H.H. JONES, USA
SSGT P. A. ROBINETTE, USAF
CDR J.X. MILLER, JR., USN
MAJ J.J. GRACE, USMC
MAJ L.H. DODSON, USAF
LCOL O.H. HALL, USA
^MSGT R.W. ANDERSON, USAF
SSGT R. OTTO, USA
LCOL I.F. MELENDBZ, USAF
SMSOT J.C. FLYNN, USAF
TSGT W.A. NICHOLS, USAF
TSGT D.W. RILEY, USAF
















NEACP OPERATIONS TEAM 2
CHIEF, CAPT C.W. HUBBELL, USN 185-5915
MAJ T.G. WARDLE, USA 185-5915
CDR T.J. ANDERSON, USN 185-5915
MSGT S.P. STUMP, USAF 185-5915
LCOL H. COOPERMAN, USAF 185-5915
MAJ V. JERICEK, USAF 185-5915
MAJ R.R. HICKS, USA 185-5915
LCDR R.W. HALL, USN 185-5915
SSOT P.L. CARTER, USAF 185-5915
SSGT C.W. SPETH, USAF 185-5915
LCOL T.P. BEOLEY, USA 185-5915
MSGT W.L. HUDSON, USA 185-5915
MSGT H.H. CISEWSKI, USAF 185-5915
TSOT T.W. TILLMAN, USAF 185-5915
TSGT O.C. WHITEHEAD, USAF 185-5915
NEACP OPERATIONS TEAM 3
CHIEF, COL E.G. JANE, JR., USAF 185-5915
LCOL D.O. SELLON, USAF 185-5915
MAJ C.A. JUSTINAK, USAF 185-5915
TSOT F.R. MUTR, USAF 185-5915
LCOL R.R. SEDGWICK, USMC 185-5915
LOCL J.H. MADDOX, USA 185-5915
MAJ M.J. HAAS, USAF 185-5915
LCDR E.G. OLSON, USN
SSGT R.B. DAVID, USAF
SSGT I.J. CARDWELL, USAF
LCOL L.A. OSBORNE, USA
SMS P.D. FOWLER, USAF
SSGT E. KNICKERBOCKER, USA
MSGT A. L. MASSLE, USAF








NBCPA OPERATIONS TEAM 1
CHIEF, CAPT W.M. BRAYBROOK, USN
LCOL R.F. MOORE, USA
RM1 W.W. SEAVER, USN
COL W.W. WILKINS, JE. , USA
CDR E.H. RYNER, USN
LCOL D.J. MANNEN, USAF
MAJ C. W. PRESSON, USA
LCDR G.J. KETCHMARK, USN
MAJ J.M. PICKARTS, USA
LCOL T.S. REA, USAF
MSGT J. MARIOTTI, USMC
RM1 A.C. FERTIG, USN
RMCA W.R. THOMAS
, USN
SMCA V.C. ELLIS, USN
LCOL C.M. SEE, USMC
SKI W; L. CONNER, USN
CAPT J. H. LYLES, USMC
YNC F.R. CHAPMAN, USN
YNC H.W. MOONEY, USN
DM1 T. W. SWEENEY, USN
YN1 D.E. HU3BITTS, USN
YN2 L.C. BROWN, USN
NBCPA OPERATIONS TEAM 2
CHIEF, COL P.I. ROBINSON, USAF
LCOL E.L. FOSSUM, USMC
CDR W. SCHROEDER, USN
MSGT W.G. RUMLEY, USAF
CAPT W.J. GRAY, USN
LCOL J.E. DAVIS, USA
CDR J.C. DAVISON, USN
MAJ W.E.PRICE, USA
MAJ F.L. SWIHART, USAF
MAJ W.G. MANSFIELD, USAF
LCDR H.H. LOVE, USN
YNCA D.F. IEARY, USN
RMC S.D. SIMMONS, USN
SFC T.K. McDERMOTT, USA
MA2 F.J. SIOMUND.JR., USN
QM2 C.A. MDCON, USN
YN1 D.L. STEPHENS, USN
LCOL J.C. ROBERTSON, USA
SK2 H.L. WILSON, USN
LT J.E. KKHOE, USN
YN1 J. ACRi; USN
YNCA W.L. YOST, USN
DM1 J.W. WISHAM JR, USN
YN2 W.D. SACRA, USN
LI3 O.P. SHEEDY, USN
SSOT S.G. SCHLAF, USA
—
J
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